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Abstract 
In 2010 the European Parliament adopted 'CRD III' (i.e. Directive 2010/76/EU 
amending the Capital Requirements Directives) which included some of the 
strictest rules in the world regarding bankers' bonuses. These rules took effect 
in January 2011. After one year of application, the ECON Committee felt that 
the time has come to check if these tough new rules on bonuses are properly 
implemented and have indeed effectively transformed the bonus culture and 
ended incentives for excessive risk-taking. 
This workshop on the Implementation of Banks' Remuneration Rules (CRD III) 
seeks to gather information on the state of play of implementation, in particular 
diverging application and the effects thereof, and will try to gain views as to the 
efficiency of the new framework for bankers' bonuses. The views of the 
European Commission, as well as the current work of the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and scientific experts in the 
area are properly taken into account for this evaluation. 
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PROGRAMME OF THE WORKSHOP 
 
 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES 
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICIES 
WORKSHOP: Banks' Remuneration Rules (CRD III): 
Are they implemented and do they work in practice? 
- Programme - 
30 January 2012, European Parliament, Brussels 
Room ASP 1G2; 15.00 - 17.30 hrs, Interpretation: DE, EN, FR 
 
15.00 - 15.15 h Welcome and Introduction: Arlene McCARTHY, ECON 
Vice-Chair and rapporteur for CRD III in 2010 
Keynote speech Michel BARNIER, Commissioner, European Commission, 
Directorate General Internal Market & Services 
15.15 - 16.15 h Presentation Session:   
Have Member States properly implemented the 
remuneration rules of CRD III? Are banks complying 
with the rules? Are there differences in implementation 
in practice?  
Opening remarks by Arlene McCARTHY, ECON Vice-Chair 
Guest speakers: 
Simonetta IANNOTTI Member of the Secretariat, Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
 The FSB Principles and Standards on Compensation 
Practices: Outstanding work to achieve full implementation 
and a level playing field 
Isabelle VAILLANT Director, Cluster Regulation, European Banking Authority (EBA) 
 Overview of the implementation of remuneration rules 
(CRD III) and CEBS/EBA Guidelines on Remuneration 
Policies and Practices (2010) and outcome of EBA 
consultation 
Maria Cristina UNGUREANU Research Fellow, University of Genoa, Genoa Centre for 
Law and Finance 
 Bankers' pay in EU banks after CRD III: Application of the 
rules in the EU and analysis of the effects 
Kern ALEXANDER  Professor, University of Cambridge 
 Practical implementation of CRD III remuneration rules in 
the U.K. - issues and results 
Sony KAPOOR Managing Director, Re-Define 
 CRD III Remuneration Rules: Implications, limitations, 
lessons learned and the way forward 
16.15 - 17.20 h Discussion - Questions & Answers 
17.20 - 17.30 h  Closing remarks by Arlene McCARTHY, ECON Vice-Chair 
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CURRICULA VITAE OF SPEAKERS 
Michel BARNIER 
Having been active from an early age in the pro-Europe wing of the Gaullist movement, 
Michel Barnier was appointed in 1993 Minister for the Environment and would go on to be 
Minister for European Affairs (1995-1997), Minister for Foreign Affairs (2004-2005) and 
Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries (2007-2009). In 1999 he resigned from national office 
to take up his post, alongside Romano PRODI, as European Commissioner for regional 
policy and institutional reform. In 2009 he led the presidential majority's campaign in the 
European elections and was the head of the French Delegation of the EPP Group in the 
European Parliament. He was then proposed as European Commissioner by the President of 
the Republic Nicolas SARKOZY and took up his post, alongside José Manuel BARROSO, as 
Member of the European Commission responsible for Internal Market and Services. 
Simonetta IANNOTTI 
Simonetta Iannotti joined the FSB Secretariat in January 2010. Her main fields of activity 
are the policy development and financial reforms on systemically important financial 
institutions, compensation structures and macroprudential frameworks. She represents the 
FSB in the Basel Committee Task Force on Compensation and in the Macroprudential 
Working Group. She was responsible for the FSB Second thematic review on compensation. 
Prior to joining the FSB, she worked at the Bank of Italy, first in the area of 
Macroprudential Analysis and then in Supervision, responsible for supervisory 
methodologies on Internal Economic Capital models and stress testing within Pillar II. She 
represented the Bank of Italy in the Basel Committee Risk Management and Modelling 
Group (RMMG). 
Author of several articles on banking, her main research interests included the study of 
bankfirm relationships, risk management and regulation. Simonetta holds a PHD in Banking 
and Regulation from Universitá La Sapienza, Rome. 
Isabelle VAILLANT 
Ms Isabelle Vaillant was recently appointed as Director of the Cluster Regulation of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) where she took office on 1 October, 2011. Before that 
date, she was Head inspector for on-site examinations at the French Financial Markets 
Authority. Ms Vaillant was on secondment from the Banque de France where she spent 
most of her career holding several positions including Deputy Director of the European and 
International Relations Directorate (2007- 2010), Head of the Large International Credit 
Institutions Supervisory Department (2005-2006), Head of the International Regulation 
Department (2001-2005), Head of the European Regulation Division (1996-2005), etc. 
Ms Vaillant graduated from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po - Paris 
Institute of Political Studies) and completed a postgraduate MSc in Economics and 
Econometrics at the Nanterre University Paris X. She published several research papers in 
English and French on different topics including Foreign currency risk in Eastern European 
banking sector (2009); How to efficiently reconcile FSAPS and article IV (2008); Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance and the backing of supervisory function by central banks (2001); 
Banks’ preparation for the Euro (1998); Banking crisis, resolution or liquidation (1996, 
Revue Banque et Stratégie), etc. 
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Maria Cristina UNGUREANU 
Maria Cristina is independent consultant in corporate governance, research fellow at the 
Centre for Law and Finance (Genoa), academic member of the European Corporate 
Governance Institute (Brussels) and visiting lecturer at the University of Pavia. Prior to her 
research activity she worked in investor relations and corporate communication in London 
and Johannesburg. 
Her areas of research and knowledge include corporate governance, financial services 
regulation and investor relations. She holds a Bachelor Degree in Economics, a Masters 
Degree in International Relations and a PhD in Finance from the University of Iasi, 
Romania. 
She is author of several papers on executive remuneration, corporate governance and 
European financial integration. She is often invited at international conferences and 
seminars to present on these topics. 
Kern ALEXANDER 
Kern Alexander holds the Professorial Chair in Law and Finance at the University of Zurich 
and is also Senior Research Fellow in Financial Regulation at the Centre for Financial 
Analysis and Policy, University of Cambridge. In 2011, he was appointed Specialist Adviser 
to the UK Parliament’s Select Committee on the Draft Financial Services Bill. He is also a 
Member of Expert Panel on Financial Services for the European Parliament. He is the author 
of numerous academic articles and several books on banking and securities law and 
international economic and financial regulation. His academic articles have been published 
in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of International Economic Law, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, the European Business Organization Review, and the Journal of 
Banking. He is co-author with John Eatwell of Global Governance of Financial Systems: the 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk (Oxford University Press, 2005), which identified 
weaknesses in bank capital regulation and systemic risk in the OTC markets before the 
2007 financial crisis. He is also the author of Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy 
(Macmillan, 2009) and Law Reform and Financial Markets (with N. Moloney; Elgar, 2011). 
In addition to academic publications, he has co-authored major reports commissioned by 
the European Parliament entitled 'Financial Supervision and Crisis Management in the EU' 
(2007), 'Clearing and Settlement in the EU' (2009), and ‘Crisis Management, Resolution 
Regimes, and Solidarity Mechanisms in the EU’ (2010). He has given oral and written 
evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee and the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs and to the European Parliament Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs on topics ranging from EU and UK banking and financial law and 
regulation to the international law of economic sanctions. He was educated at Cornell, 
Oxford, Cambridge and London universities. He was educated Cornell University, University 
of Cambridge and University of Oxford. 
Sony KAPOOR 
Sony Kapoor's career spans working in the financial sector, with civil society and on public 
policy across several countries. As Managing Director of Re-Define, an economic and 
financial think tank that advises policy makers in the EU and internationally, he is deeply 
involved in finding a solution to the on-going economic and financial crises.  
Mr Kapoor is known for his work on financial regulation, economic governance, crisis 
management and international development. In his personal capacity he is the chairman of 
the Banking Stakeholder Group of the European Banking Authority, a member of the expert 
panel of the Crisis (CRIS) committee of the European Parliament and a Visiting Fellow at 
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the London School of Economics. He is also a consultant to several governments and EU 
institutions.  
Mr Kapoor has previously worked in investment banking and derivative trading for 
institutions including ICICI (International Credit and Investment Corporation of India), 
Lehman Brothers and Aquila Energy Limited. He left the financial sector in 2003 to work 
on reforming the financial system and improving public policymaking.  
He has also worked extensively on international development, including during a stint as a 
strategy adviser to the Government of Norway. He co-founded the International Tax 
Justice Network, served on the boards of several NGOs, ran development economics at 
Christian Aid and was a strategy adviser to both Oxfam Novib and Jubilee USA. He was 
also a development finance consultant for the World Bank and United Nations as well as 
for governments in Europe and the developing world.  
He has testified as an expert witness on international finance at the European Parliament, 
the US Congress, the Bundestag and other parliaments, and conducted seminars and 
lectures at various finance ministries, central banks, universities, multilateral institutions 
and the European Commission. His comments and analysis of the crisis are often picked 
up by publications such as the Financial Times & the Wall Street Journal and media outlets 
such as the BBC, Reuters and Bloomberg.  
Mr Kapoor holds a Chemical Engineering degree from the prestigious Indian Institute of 
Technology, an MBA from the Faculty of Management Studies (University of Delhi), one of 
India's leading business schools and an MSC in International Finance from the London 
School of Economics. 
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KEYNOTE SPEECH BY MICHEL BARNIER, COMMISSIONER 
 
Published on Commissioner Barnier's webpage: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/48&format=HTML&a
ged=0&language=FR&guiLanguage=en  
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1. PRESENTATION BY SIMONETTA IANNOTTI 
 
 
 
The FSB P&S on compensation:
Outstanding work to achieve full implementation and a level 
playing field
EU Parliament workshop: Banks' Remuneration Rules (CRD III): 
Are they implemented and do they work in practice?
Simonetta Iannotti, FSB, Member of Secretariat
30 January 2012
 
 
 
 
 
Overview of the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
Established: April 2009
Chairperson: Governor Mark Carney (Bank of Canada) 
Membership: Authorities responsible for financial 
stability (ie treasuries, central banks and financial 
supervisory agencies) of 24 jurisdictions
+
International standard setting bodies, IFIs and central 
bank committees related to market infrastructure
Location:  FSB Secretariat is hosted by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland.
2
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Compensation Roadmap
G20 endorsed the FSB Principles for sound compensation practices (London, April 2009) and 
their Implementation standards (Pittsburgh, September 2009)
BCBS/IAIS incorporated  the Principles into supervisory guidance; IOSCO incorporated the 
Principles into disclosure guidance
Periodic review of implementation mandated to  FSB
First review March 2010 
G20 Toronto 2010: Maintain reform momentum
Countries to fully implement Principles and Standards by end 2010
FSB to undertake ongoing monitoring 
Second review October 2011,  with Assessment Criteria, presented to G20 FM&CBGs
G20 Summit 2011: Implementation monitoring
• Ongoing FSB monitoring on compensation practices
• Set up of bilateral complaint handling process
3
 
 
 
 
 
The First peer review on compensation 
Published in March 2010, 1st Thematic Peer Review done by the FSB
Main observations:
Progress and movement towards convergence across jurisdictions; first changes 
taking place in major firms
Still early in the process and effective implementation far from complete 
Gaps, different in approaches, technical difficulties
Consulting firms review shows financial firms as responsive
More work needed in some areas: risk and performance alignment and
disclosure 
More evidence needed on changes in industry practices to complete judgment on 
the adequacy of ongoing efforts – Second Review Mandated to FSB
4
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The Second peer review on compensation
 Published in October 2011, shortly before G20 Cannes Summit
 Relevant authorities and firms in FSB member countries have made good 
progress in implementing the Principles and Standards
 A total of 13 of 24 jurisdictions (7 more) have  implemented all P&S; 5  have implemented 
all but one or two standards; remaining jurisdictions still in the process (all EMEs)
 Of the firms, 20 identified as large internationally active are most advanced; their 
compensation practices appear on average broadly consistent with P&S. 
 These are located in jurisdictions that moved earlier, and were given priority in 
supervisory action: Implementation efforts do make a difference!!
 Despite these strides, more work is needed:
A) To achieve full implementation by national authorities
B) To address concerns over level playing field issues, particularly in pay structures (St. 6-
9); guarantees (St. 11); hedging (St. 14); identification of material risk takers 
“Achieving lasting change within firms is a long term challenge 
that requires sustained commitment”
5
 
 
 
 
 
The Second peer review: Close up on EU implementation 
In the EU,  convergence towards a rules-based regulatory approach following the 
implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) III
 France, Germany,  Italy, the Netherlands,  Spain, and the UK are all among the 13 FSB 
jurisdictions that have achieved full implementation 
 The 6 FSB members of the EU have incorporated the numbers in Standards 6 to 9 as 
minimum requirements. Other jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, US) 
have interpreted the numbers in Standards 6 to 9 as examples rather than minimum 
requirements and allowed firms more flexibility, taking account of differences in their 
business models and risk profiles. 
There are some differences in the proportionality approach: 
 All 6 FSB Members of the EU  regulate or plan to regulate compensation practices at all 
firms
 Germany Italy UK have also adopted a tiered approach that differentiates firms on the 
basis of their systemic importance 
 All 6 FSB Members of the EU apply their frameworks to material risk takers and control 
staff at all levels of a firm; in Germany and Italy, smaller institutions have more discretion 
in how they extend these rules below the level of top executives
All 6 FSB members of the EU had planned horizontal supervisory reviews for 2011
6
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The Second peer review: Close up on firms’ assessment
 Firms have made better progress in governance structures to oversee the 
compensation system’s design and operation; 62 percent of the firms have broadly 
implemented the P&S
 For firms with gaps, of relevance is an insufficient level of independence of the 
remuneration committee and little involvement of risk and compliance functions in the 
process, 
 In pay structures, large internationally active firms have made more progress 
(higher numbers and less variation across firms). Numbers are similar for firms 
headquartered in North America and Europe 
 Also good progress has been achieved in the areas of no hedging and golden 
parachutes 
 More gaps in the area of alignment of compensation with performance; only half 
of the firms in the sample having broadly implemented the related P&S
 Disclosure is the area where most progress is needed; 26 percent broadly 
implemented the P&S 7
 
 
 
 
 
The Second peer review: Recommendations
1 - Full implementation by national authorities
 Proportionality criteria clearly specified
2 – Addressing level playing field concerns
 Bilateral supervisory exchanges and complaint handling process
 To inform scope and intensity of FSB monitoring 
3 – Ongoing implementation monitoring
 The FSB to undertake ongoing monitoring and public reporting on the implementation of the P&S
 To consider scope and appropriate timing for a follow-up peer review on compensation practices 
 and any decision to issue additional FSB guidance on the interpretation of the definition of MRT 
4 – Supervisory cooperation 
 Supervisory networks to be used to exchange information to enhance the effectiveness and consistency of 
implementation.  Focus on evolving practices in the areas of risk adjustment and performance alignment
5 – Effective governance of compensation
 Supervisors to  ensure full adherence by significant  firms to the key requirements in the area of effective 
governance of compensation. 
6 – Disclosure
 Supervisors to ensure compliance by significant firms to  Basel Committee’s Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for 
remuneration from 1 January 2012.
8
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FSB: Renewed focus on implementation monitoring
G20 Summit 2011, agreed on the FSB to establish
 Coordination framework for implementation monitoring
We agree to intensify our monitoring of financial regulatory reforms, report on our progress and 
track our deficiencies. To do so, we endorse the FSB coordination framework for 
implementation monitoring, notably on key areas such as the Basel capital and liquidity 
frameworks, OTC derivatives reforms, compensation practices, G-SIFI policies, resolution 
frameworks, and shadow banking. 
 Ongoing monitoring and public reporting on compensation 
practices 
We reaffirm our commitment to discourage compensation practices that lead to excessive risk 
taking by implementing the agreed FSB principles and standards on compensation. While 
good progress has been made, impediments to full implementation remain in some 
jurisdictions. We therefore call on the FSB to undertake an ongoing monitoring and public 
reporting on compensation practices focused on remaining gaps and impediments to full 
implementation of these standards and carry out an on-going bilateral complaint handling 
process to address level playing field concerns of individual firms. Based on the 
findings of this ongoing monitoring, we call on the FSB to consider any additional guidance 
on the definition of material risk takers and the scope and timing of peer review process. 
9
 
 
 
 
 
References
 Principles for sound compensation practices
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf
 Implementation standards
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf
 First Thematic Peer Review on Compensation Practices
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf
 2011 Follow up Peer review
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111011a.pdf
Simonetta.iannotti@bis.org
fsb@bis.org
www.financialstabilityboard.org
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Background slides
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United StatesNetherlandsGermany
United KingdomJapanFrance
SwitzerlandItalyCanada
SingaporeHong KongAustralia
TurkeyRussiaIndia
Total = 24 + EUFSF members
G20 members
SpainMexicoChina
South AfricaKoreaBrazil
Saudi ArabiaIndonesiaArgentina
FSB Country membership
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13
 The FSB is an international body to co-ordinate the work of national 
financial authorities and international standard setting bodies
to
 Promote global financial stability
 Coordinate regulatory supervisory and other policy development and 
implementation
 address vulnerabilities
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the international level the 
work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies (SSBs) in order to 
develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial 
sector policies.  In collaboration with the international financial institutions, the FSB will address 
vulnerabilities affecting financial systems in the interest of global financial stability.
- FSB Charter, Article 1
Objectives of the FSB
 
 
 
 
 
14
Mandate of the FSB 
Original mandate (1999):
 assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, identify and oversee action 
needed to address them
 promote coordination and information sharing among authorities responsible for 
financial stability
 monitor and advise on market developments
 Advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards
Broadened mandate – in addition (2009):
 Collaborate with IMF, including by conducting Early Warning Exercises
 Undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the 
international standard setting bodies 
 set guidelines for and support supervisory colleges
 contingency planning for cross-border crisis management (particularly for 
systemically important firms)
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1. Implementing the SIFI framework, including resolution 
 Extension to Domestic SIFIs, global insurance companies and global non banks
 Resolution Key Attributes: assessment methodology and thematic review
 G-SIFI resolvability assessments, RRPs, cross-border cooperation agreements
2. OTC and commodity derivatives market reforms, including Global Legal entity 
identifier (LEI) 
3. Shadow banking
 Framework for monitoring
 Regulatory action in 5 areas 
4. Other reform areas
 CRAs
 Consumer protection
 Accounting standards convergence
5. Implementation monitoring
 Country and thematic peer reviews
 Monitoring of national implementation of agreed g20/financial reforms
6. FSB resources and governance
FSB Policy priorities
15
Source: The G20 Cannes Summit  (http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/for-the-press/news-
releases/cannes-summit-final-declaration.1557.html)
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The FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices
 The firm’s board of directors must actively oversee the compensation system’s design 
and operation 
 The firm’s board of directors must monitor and review the compensation system to 
ensure the system operates as intended
 Staff engaged in financial and risk control must be independent, have appropriate 
authority and be compensated in a manner that is independent of the business areas 
they oversee and commensurate with their key role in the firm
 See also BCBS Principles for enhancing corporate governance, October 2010
Principles for effective governance in compensation
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The FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices
 Compensation must be adjusted for all types of risk 
 Compensation outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes
 Compensation payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks
 The mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation must be consistent with risk 
alignment
See also BCBS  Range of methodologies for risk and performance alignment of 
remuneration, May 2011
Principles for effective risk-alignment of compensation
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The FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices
 Supervisory review of compensation practices must be rigorous and sustained, and 
deficiencies must be addressed promptly with supervisory action
 Now review to be conducted in PII 
See BCBS Enhancement to the BII Framework, July 2009
 Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their 
compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders
See BCBS Pillar 3 Disclosure requirements for remuneration, July 2011
Principles for effective oversight and stakeholder engagement
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FSB Implementation standards
 Detailed specific proposals on compensation governance, structure and disclosure to 
strengthen adherence to the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices.
 Focus on areas where progress is needed:
 Independent and effective board oversight of comp. policies Remuneration committee
 Linkages of total variable compensation pool to overall performance of the firm and need to 
maintain a sound capital base
 Compensation structure and risk alignment (deferral, vesting, clawbacks)
 Limitations on guaranteed bonuses
 Enhanced public disclosure and transparency of compensation
 Enhanced supervisory oversight of compensation 
Motivation and Focus
 
 
 
 
 
20
Second thematic review: close-up on pay structure
20 Large internationally active firms, averages
51
E. The most highly paid 
employees not 
covered above
37 89 57 3 54
52 48
C. Other senior 
executives
50 80 63 3 58
81 74 4 68
55
D. Other employees 
whose individual 
actions have a material 
impact on the risk 
exposure of the firm
704 76 59 3
64
B. Other members of 
the executive board 7 78 67 4 61 62
A. Most senior 
members of the 
executive board
10
Number of 
employees
Variable Compensation
% of total 
compensation
% that is 
deferred
Deferral period 
(number of 
years)
% awarded in 
shares or share‐
linked instruments
% subject to 
ex post risk 
adjustment
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2. PRESENTATION BY ISABELLE VAILLANT 
 
 
 
ECON Workshop: Banks’
Remuneration Rules (CRD III):  
Are they implemented and do 
they work in practice?
Brussels, 30 January 2012
Isabelle Vaillant
Director Regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
Outline
I. CRD III and Guidelines on remuneration policies and 
practices
II. Implementation study: Preliminary findings
III.Guidelines for data collection on bank remuneration 
practices
2
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Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
I From principles to CRD III 
2009 2010 2011
FSB Principles / 
CEBS 
High Level principles on 
remuneration / 
EC Recommendation:
Spring 2009
FSB 
Implementation 
Standards: 
September 2009
End of Trilogue
negotiations on CRD III: 
July 2010
Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision, SIG Task Force 
on Remuneration, Report on 
the Range of Methodologies 
for Risk and Performance 
Alignment of Remuneration:
Consultation launched  
Mid October 2010
Publication CRD III:       
14 December 2010 
Implementation 
date for  CRD III 
remuneration 
provisions: 
1 January 2011
Proposal CRD III:
July 2009
CEBS Guidelines:
Publication 10 December 2010
3
Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision, Compensation 
Principles and Standards 
Assessment Methodology:
January 2010
G20 
announcemen
t on 
compensation 
practices:
September 
2009
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
I Structure of CRD III remuneration provisions
• Published 14 December 2010 in the Official Journal
• Recitals state intention to address the potentially 
detrimental effect of poorly designed remuneration 
structures on the management of risk and control of risk-
taking behaviour by individuals
• General legal basis: Art. 22 CRD
• Annex V CRD: actual remuneration provisions
(points 23 and 24)
• Annex XII CRD: transparency provisions
• Main purpose: Establishment of risk-based remuneration
policies and practices, aligened with the long-term
interests of the institution Avoidance of excessive
risk taking
4
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Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
I Mandate for the EBA
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors shall 
ensure the existence of guidelines on sound 
remuneration policies which comply with the principles 
set out in points 23 and 24 of Annex V.
Broad but limited at the same time:
CEBS Guidelines document is all-encompassing with its 
own logic, but constrained by clear level 1 decisions
Aims at creating a level playing field within EU while 
keeping flexibility at the same time
5
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
I Summa divisio
• Common introductory outlines
• Distinction between:
• Three blocks:
• Governance
• Risk alignment
• General requirements
• Specific requirements
• Transparency
6
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Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
II Preliminary Findings of the Implementation study
• Launched in November 2011
• Two main areas examined: 
(i) How did legislators and supervisors implement the guidelines in 
their legislative frameworks? 
(ii) How are the principles of the GL supervised in practice? 
• Around 90 questions divided into three blocks:
(i) General aspects of implementation,
(ii) specific implementation questions,
(iii) implementation of specific principles.
• Plus: numerical information for a sample of banks that
represents at least 60% of total assets or the 20 largest
institutions in one Member State. 
7
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
II Areas where satisfactory progress has been achieved
General aspects of implementation:
 Guidelines were implemented swiftly by all NSAs except for two due
to delays in the legislative process regarding CRD III transposition. 
 In all countries, the guidelines are part of the Supervisory Review
Process. 
Specific aspects of implementation
 Governance of remuneration: 
- Good implementation of the governance requirements has been 
observed
- Remuneration committees broadly set up
- Management body in its supervisory function involved in determination
of remuneration schemes. 
 Risk alignment: The setting up of multi-year frameworks, including
deferral periods, is now widespread.
8
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Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
II Critical areas which need further supervisory work
Scope of application
 No substantive exemptions at national level to the application
of the guidelines, HOWEVER 
 Considerable variations in terms of application of the 
guidelines beyond the scope of the CRD and proportionality, e.g. 
application on insurance undertakings and/or no thresholds for
application of proportionality. 
 Identified risk takers: Large variety of criteria for this internal
exercise is applied, e.g. Case-by-case decisions without fixed
criteria, salary thresholds, position in the organisation.
Number of risk takers differs considerably between Member
States, with a clear tendency towards low numbers. 
Substantial threat to the effectiveness of the EU supervisory
reforms on remuneration. 
9
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
II Critical areas which need further supervisory work
Techniques for risk alignment
 Net profits and, to a lesser extent, risk adjusted performance 
parameters are used for setting-up bonus pools, HOWEVER
Lack of consistence with parameters used for risk mangement
purposes.
Range of possibilities for discretionary judgements and a lack
of transparency how they are applied.
Criteria for ex-post risk adjustements tend to lack back testing
character with regard to the initially measured performance.
Observed ratios variable to fixed tend to be high and criteria for
their determination not always transparent and plausible.   
10
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Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
II Critical areas which need further supervisory work
Preliminary conclusions:
Satisfactory implementation in legal and 
supervisory frameworks.
HOWEVER
Further supervisory guidance needed in the 
following areas: 
(i)Identification of Risk Takers,
(ii)Scope of application beyond CRD, 
(iii)Determination of variable vs. fixed
remuneration.
11
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
II Critical areas which need further supervisory work
Preliminary conclusions (2)
More advanced industry practices necessary in the 
areas of:
-Ex-ante and ex-post risk measurement techniques
and linkage with risk taker’s performance 
measurement and compensation,
-Alternative share plans,
-Usage of hybrid Tier 1 instruments. 
12
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Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
III Guidelines for data collection on bank   
remuneration practices
• CRD III introduced two new tasks for the EBA:
(i) Benchmarking of remuneration trends and 
practices at Union level,
(ii) disclosure of the number of high earners on an
aggregate Member State level.  
• Both tasks require data collection in a 
harmonized fashion – to be facilitated by two
guidelines.
13
 
 
 
 
 
Isabelle Vaillant | European Banking Authority | Brussels, 30 January 2012 
III Guidelines for data collection on bank   
remuneration practices
• Guidelines publically consulted July – September 
2011. 
• Comments mostly technical in nature; relating to 
scope of application, level of consolidation, 
award periods and date of first remittance.
• Guidelines will be published beginning of 
February.
• Date of first data remittance June 2012, relating 
to fixed and variable remuneration awarded for 
the 2010 and 2011 performance years.
14
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Bankers’ pay in EU banks after CRD III: 
Application of the rules in the EU and analysis of the effects
Maria Cristina Ungureanu
Genoa Centre for Law and Finance 
European Corporate Governance Institute
European Parliament
Workshop Implementation of CRD III remuneration rules 
Brussels, 30 January 2012
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Transposition
Legislation through amendments to existing national laws
or / and
New regulations issued by financial supervisors
Generally follow the text of the CRD III 
Some variation in implementation:
• Timing
• Proportionality
• Design
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UK FR IT ES NL BE LU
Decree Decree of 13 
December 2010 
amending
Regulation No. 97‐
02 on the internal
control of credit
institutions
Decree on 
Controlled
Remuneration
Policy (Jan ‘11)
Royal Decree of 22 
February 2011 
approving the CBFA 
Regulations and 
amending the 
Banking Law
Law The Sustainable
Economy Act
(Mar ’11)
Regulation
Circular
FSA, 
Remuneration
Code (Revised) 
(Dec ’10)
Bank of Italy, 
Supervisory
measures
concerning the 
remuneration and 
incentive practices
of banks (Mar ’11)
DNB, Regulation on 
Controlled
Remuneration
Policy (Jan ’11)
Regulation of CBFA 
of 8 February
2011 on sound 
remuneration
policies in financial
institutions
Circular
CBFA_2011_05 on 
sound 
remuneration policy
Circulars CSSF 
10/496 and CSSF 
10/497 (Dec ’10)
Circular CSSF 
11/505, Details 
relating to the 
application of the 
principle of 
proportionality 
(Apr ’11)
Transposition
Undergoing research (as at December 2011)
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AU DE SW DK FI RO PL
Decree Ministry of Finance, 
Ordinance on 
Remuneration in 
Financial Institutions
(Oct ’10)
Law Amendment to
the Banking Act
(Dec ’10) 
Amendments to the 
German Banking Act
2010
Bill on remuneration
policies in financial
(Nov ’10)
Amendment to the 
Danish Financial 
Business Act
Amendment to
the Banking Act
and the Act on 
Trading in 
Financial 
Instruments
(Apr ’11)
Regulation
Circular
BaFIN, Regulation on 
the Supervisory
Requirements for
Institutions’
Remuneration
Systems (Oct ’10)
Swedish FSA,  
Regulations
following the 
implementation
of directive CRD 
III (Feb ’11)
Finnish
supervision 
release 62/2010
National Bank of
Romania, 
Amendment to
the Regulation
18/2009 
concerning the 
management of
credit institutions’
activities
Banks: Resolution
by Financial 
Supervision 
Authority
Brokers: 
Regulation by the 
Ministry of
Finance
Transposition
Undergoing research (as at December 2011)
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Proportionality
Credit institutions and investment firms may apply the provisions in different
ways according to size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and 
complexity of their activities
UK
4 tiers, each subject to decreasing minimum expectations of compliance:
• 1, 2 ‐ credit institutions and broker dealers with significant banking
activities
• 3 ‐ small firms that may occasionally take risks
• 4 ‐ no‐risk firms
3 & 4 may neutralise the rules on deferral, performance adjustment and 
retained shares
Neutralisation for identified employees if: 
• individual total remuneration < GBP 500,000, and 
• individual variable remuneration < 33% of the individual total 
remuneration
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Germany
Full adoption: 
• Institutions with the average total assets of the previous three fiscal years
>= EUR 10 billion, and 
• The importance of the institution is confirmed in a self‐conducted
complex risk analysis
Italy
Full adoption:
• Larger financial institutions – i.e. with consolidated asset value of at least
EUR 40 Billion
• Risk employees: 
• earnings above EUR 200,000/year, or 
• variable part exceeding 20% of the total remuneration
Proportionality
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Luxembourg
Allowing proportionality for:
• Banks: 
• Total assets do not exceed EUR 5 billion; and 
• The global capital requirement to cover risks < EUR 1,562,5 million
• Investment firms: Net result of their activities is lower than 20% of the 
global net result before taxation
• Employees: Variable remuneration < EUR 100,000
Netherlands
• Generic provision – concerning investment firms
Proportionality
 
 
 
 
 
8
UK
• Deferment: GBP 500,000 the amount of variable remuneration triggering 
the 60% deferral requirement 
Italy
• Retention period: 2‐year retention period applying to the upfront part of
variable remuneration paid in financial instruments
Germany
• Deferment: additional requirements ‐ at least 50% of the deferred element
must be subject to the continuing sustainable development of the bank
Austria
• Deferral period: minum 5 years
Variations
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Belgium
• Deferment: 50% of variable remuneration with 25% being deferred for a two
year period and 25% for a period of at least three years
Variable remuneration < 25% of total gross remuneration need not be
deferred
Netherlands & Romania
• Timing: rules apply only as from 2011 onwards
Did not apply to: 
‐ Remuneration due on the basis of contracts concluded before January 1 2011 
and awarded after this date
‐ Remuneration awarded for services provided in 2010 and not yet paid by 
January 1 2011
Variations
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• Temporal differences in implementation ‐‐‐ ‘first mover disadvantage’
• One‐sided implementation ‐‐‐ ‘country disadvantage’
• More onerous rules for banks  ‐‐‐ ‘industry disadvantage’
• Differences in application of the proportionality principle ‐‐‐
complexity of global compensation schemes at international banks
• Employment law issues: malus and clawback
e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy
• Q1: right of the employee to refuse amendments to an existing contract
• Q2: right of a financial institution to claim reimbursement of
remunerations paid in breach of CRD III 
Answers depend on
• The legal nature of the implementation instruments; reaction of national
legislators
Implementation issues
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Research: 34 Banks FTSEurofirst 300 ‐ market capitalisation
Variation in progress among banks
• More progress – UK, CH, FR, IT 
banks in countries with early implementation of the global standards
• Slow progress – AU, ES, GR 
banks in jurisdictions at an early stage of implementation
Nature of transposition (decree/law/regulation) does not seem to influence
Application of risk considerations by the banks that reviewed pay policies
• Incorporating economic profit, return on risk weighted assets
• Involvement of risk & control functions
 Clawback still at low levels
UK IT ES FR SW CH DE AU BE NO DK GR
5 5 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
Adoption by banks
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Area Criteria Incl. UK
Continental 
Europe
RemCom
RemCom existence 94% 93%
RemCom ‐ majority
independent 69% 66%
Risk function in the process 51% 44%
Remuneration structure Cash+bonus + LTIP 69% 65%
Remuneration policy
Deferment Y/N 66% 66%
Deferment > 40% 74% 41%
Deferment > 3y 96% 59%
Equity/Instruments > 50% 31% 24%
Retention period 40% 31%
Malus / clawback 37% 28%
Disclosure
Consolidated
remuneration report 63% 59%
Remuneration policy 89% 89%
Individual disclosure 71% 69%
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Data: FTSEurofirst 300: 2007, 2009 - 40 banks, 2010 - 34 banks; variation: 10 banks
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Assessment based on disclosure in Annual Reports – limits
Generally, no significant improvement in disclosure comparing to previous 
years 
• Italy‐exception, improved considerably
• UK, Swiss banks still best performers
• Austrian, Portuguese, Greek banks: lowest range ‐ no individual disclosure
UK top 5 banks: disclosure of five highest paid senior executives in addition to 
that of executive directors (Project Merlin)
Research complemented with reports from the Authorities (field research)
• FED – Horizontal Review: 16 US operations & 9 US operations of EU banks
• FSB – Thematic Review: a wider spectrum, including large and smaller 
institutions from across all continents
 Similar results
Disclosure
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• Implementation in practice reflects the pace of national transposition 
and the degree of international activity of each bank
• A certain degree of convergence has been achieved – general principles
• Variations may enhance the complexity of remuneration policies, 
particularly at cross‐border banks
• However, harmonization of compensation rules is not always beneficial
– Introducing rigidity in pay structures 
– Depriving boards of the possibility to experiment new arrangements 
• Banks should consider the reforms as an opportunity to rethink their 
compensation design
Conclusions
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• Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Bankers’ Pay after the 2008 Crisis: 
Regulatory Reforms in the US and the EU, 6 Zeitschrift fur Bankrecht und 
Bankwirtschaft (Journal of Banking Law and Banking), December 2011
• Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Lost in Implementation: The Rise and 
Value of the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices at Financial Institutions, 
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier, N. 1‐2, May 2011, pp. 60‐65; runner‐up ICFR‐
Financial Times Research Prize 2010
• Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Economics, Politics and the International 
Principles for Sound Compensation Practices. An Analysis of Executive Pay at 
European Banks, 64 Vanderbilt Law Review, 2011, 431‐502
• Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Pay at Ailing Banks and 
Beyond: A European Perspective, Capital Markets Law Journal 5(2), 2010, 197‐217
• Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive 
Remuneration in Crisis Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10 Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 73, 2010, 73–118
Related research
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Maria Cristina Ungureanu (PhD)
Research Coordinator & Consultant
Genoa Centre for Law and Finance
European Corporate Governance Institute
www.news.cristinaungureanu.eu
info@cristinaungureanu.eu
Contact
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Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
Practical implementation of CRD III 
remuneration rules in the UK –
issues and results
European Parliament Workshop on
the Implementation of the CRD III 
Remuneration Rules
Professor Kern Alexander
30 January 2012
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 1
 
 
 
 
 
Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
Main points
Objectives of remuneration regulation
UK bank remuneration regulation pre-CRD III
UK bank remuneration regulation post-CRD III
Difficulties and challenges
Related issues
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 2
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Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
Objectives of remuneration regulation
1. Reduce principal-agent problem – asymmetric
information.  Enhanced shareholder monitoring and 
complete contracts to control bankers‘ excessive risk-
taking and enhance firm performance
2.  Public policy concerns of taxpayer subsidies to 
financial firms (ie., bailouts) that encourage failed
business and risk management. Subsidies create
moral hazard to encourage greater risk-taking than
what is socially optimal. 
3.  Social and political backlash at huge salary
differentials and big bonuses – ‚Occupy the City‘, 
‚Occupy Wall Street‘
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 3
 
 
 
 
 
Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
UK bank remuneration regulation
UK remuneration regulation pre-CRD III inadequate but
2009 Code and FS Act 2010 provided adequate regulatory
and legal basis for reforms
CRD III focuses attention on agency problems and 
excessive risk-taking.  But rules on bonuses too
prescriptive and will lead to much higher compliance costs
for EU/UK firms and competitive problems with non-EU
firms in attracting personnel. 
Increased complexity of CRD III may lead to regulatory
capture and limit market disclosure
Role of shareholder stewardship?
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 4
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Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
UK remuneration regulation pre-CRD III 
European Commission Recommendations (2009) 
FSA Remuneration Code 2009 – implemented into
FSA Handbook through Part 4 powers.  
Financial Services Act 2010 –
FSA statutory powers to require disclosure
Regulate the way banks pay employees
Recover deferred and undeferred
compensation (malus & clawback)   
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 5
 
 
 
 
 
Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
CRD III – key areas for UK  
Align remuneration with effective risk management
Prescriptive rules-based regime for bonus controls –
50%, 40%/60% rule.  
Performance-based measures over time as risk
materialises and bonus adjustment rules
Enhanced corporate governance (ie.,independent
remuneration committees) and proportionality
Covers most EU-based financial firms and overseas
branches and EU subsidiaries of non-EU groups
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 6
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Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
UK remuneration regulation and CRD III 
FSA Revised Remuneration Code 2010 –
Principle 12  ‚remuneration structures‘
Reluctant adoption of 50%, 40%/60% rule
Critical of CEBS interpretations
Proportionality principle
De minimis rule
4 classifications of firms – application
intensity depends on firm size, nature of 
risks, and market inter-connections
Performance adjustment – malus and clawback
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 7
 
 
 
 
 
Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
Challenges of implementation for UK
24.01.2012
CRD III remuneration requirements – especially rules-
based bonus structures - increase complexity
Difficult for shareholders and stakeholders to 
comprehend complicated rules. 
Limits effective disclosure to the market, thereby
reducing shareholder protection and weakens risk
management.  Lack of disclosure of pay bands
Unintended effect of increasing excessive risk-
taking and undermining firm performance
Kern Alexander © 8
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Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut
Shareholder stewardship and moral hazard
Role of large bank shareholders encouraging excessive
risk-taking
Limited liability structure creates moral hazard for
shareholders to pressure the board/executives to 
approve greater risk-taking and reward it with lavish
bouses.  Prior to crisis, greater leverage increased risk-
adjusted returns on equity (ROE) (25% for some large 
banks).  New metrics on performance needed.
Limitations on limited liability?  
New culture of shareholder stewardship?   
24.01.2012 Kern Alexander © 9
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1
Improving Remuneration Practices 
in the Financial Sector 
CRD III – Implications, Limitations, 
Lessons learnt & the way forward
Sony Kapoor
Managing Director
Re‐Define
European Parliament Workshop on Implementation of CRD III Remuneration Rules
Brussels, 30 January 2012
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Implications: Objectives 
addressed! Success?
• Reduce incentives for excessive risk‐taking (3/10)
• Reduce incentives for socially harmful activities 
(2/10)
• Make compensation structures fairer (3/10)
• Conserve capital for financial institutions (1/10)
• Allow a firm to better manage costs through the 
cycle (2/10)
• Align incentives with interests of shareholders, 
stakeholders or society (1/10)
 
PE 464.465 43 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
3
Implications: Performance of CRD 
III Provisions?
• Align remuneration to risk (4/10)
• Capital retention (1/10)
• Limits on upfront cash bonuses (8/10)
• Deferment & claw back (5/10)
• At least 50% in shares or similar instruments (5/10)
• Bonuses capped to salary (1/10)
• Limits to bonuses in bailed out banks (3/10)
• Bonus like pension covered (Too soon to tell)
• Transparency & benchmarking of pay (2/10)
• Corporate governance reforms (4/10)
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Limitations: How can such high 
bonuses be payable?
• Scalability of financial activities 
• Implicit and explicit subsidy provided by 
society
• Complexity and opacity of financial activities
• Lack of competition in the financial services 
industry  
• A fundamental mis‐understanding between 
risk and loss 
• Behavioural economic explanations 
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Limitations: How are these 
bonuses generated?
• Taking on excessive leverage 
• Business line diversification 
• Expansion of trading books 
• Growth of structured products 
• Churning in trading 
• Too many LBOs and M&A deals
• Riskier assets 
• Taking on excessive maturity mis‐match 
• Writing options 
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Lessons: Understanding incentives
• Deal A: 80% chance of $50 million profit & 20% chance of $100 million loss 
• Deal B: 80% chance of $100 million profit & 20% chance of $300 million loss
• The expected value of deal A and deal B both is $20 million but they have a very 
different risk profile. Deal B poses a much greater risk for the bank. 
• Now imagine that the trader was entitled to 25% of the profit he generated (a 
smaller percentage is more likely but 10% ‐ 20% is not uncommon for star 
traders). 
• Let us further assume that he would get fired in case the bank lost money on the 
deal – usually the worst outcome that can befall a trader. 
• So from the traders point of view Deal A = 80% chance of $12.5 million bonus 
(25% of $50 million profit) and a 20% chance of zero compensation. Deal B = 80% 
chance of $25 million bonus and 20% chance of getting fired and hence zero 
compensation. 
• For the trader, Deal A has an expected value of $10 million and Deal B has an 
expected value of $20 million. He will almost always choose Deal B. 
• Because, part of the downside of the trader’s decisions is borne not by him 
personally but by the firm, he will almost always choose to load the firm up on risk 
so as to maximize his personal bonus payment. 
• The closer the links of the bonuses to profit generated, the less the risk 
adjustment, the lower the base salary as a component of the total compensation 
the more excessive risk the trader has an incentive to take compared to what 
might be optimal for the firm. 
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Lessons: Understanding Incentives 
• Now let us look at the shareholder perspective 
• Let us assume that a bank has a share capital of $100 million. Let us say it 
faces the same decisions as the trader 
• Deal A: 80% chance of $50 million profit & 20% chance of $100 million loss 
• Deal B: 80% chance of $100 million profit & 20% chance of $300 million 
loss
• Typically, investment bank shareholders get about 50% revenue earned in 
the form of dividends with the rest distributed amongst employees. 
• The pay‐off for Deal A = 0.5*(0.8*$50 million – 0.2*$100 million) = $10 
million. 
• For deal B, it is important to consider that because of limited liability bank 
shareholders are only liable for the amount their shareholder capital 
which is $100 million. So the most they can lose is $100 million not $300 
million. The calculation will then take the form Deal B = 0.5*(0.8*$100 
million – 0.2*$100 million) = $30 million. 
• Thus bank shareholders would prefer to do Deal B despite the fact that 
the deal is much more risky for the firm. Crucially, the $200 million of 
excess losses will be borne by the financial sector outside the firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
8
Lessons: Understanding Incentives 
• Bank employees get the upside, in the form of bonuses, of the excessive 
risks they load on to the firms they work for. Their personal downside is 
limited to being fired, the equivalent of zero compensation. The downside 
instead falls within and outside of the firms they work for. 
• Bank shareholders typically reap about 50% or so of the excess returns 
that the banks they own generate because of excessive risk taking by their 
employees. The downside of shareholders is limited to the amount of 
share capital they own since they have limited liability. The rest of the 
downside risk is borne by other stakeholders in the firm, such as 
bondholders; by other financial firms and by the real sector. 
• The financial sector as a whole benefits completely from excessive profits 
generated by excessive risks taken but faces only part of the downside 
since a significant proportion of the costs fall on the real sector of the 
economy. 
• Several levels of asymmetries exist, which work together to ensure that 
financial sector actors – employees, shareholders, firms and other 
stakeholders all have incentives to take on excessive risks and earn rents 
at the cost of the rest of the economy. 
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Way forward: Limiting the upside  
• Limit bonuses and other forms of variable compensation to a small 
fraction of the fixed compensation say between 10%‐50%. This would 
significantly reduce the asymmetry between the upside and downside 
faced by bankers because of their actions. 
• Put an absolute cap on compensation, multiple of the average worker’s 
salary 20 – 40 times. 
• Impose a much higher tax on bonuses in excess of a certain amount, say 
Euro 25,000. 
• Limit firm compensation in terms of percentage of revenue to say 25% of 
firm revenue on a 3 year rolling average basis. 
• Make banks factor  externality posed by employee behaviour when 
calculating bonus amounts. 
• Impose a higher discount factor on the firm’s compensation decisions as 
the overall level of risk in a firm and in the financial system increases. 
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Way forward: Limiting the upside
• Get the supervisor to ensure that bonuses are paid on a risk 
adjusted basis only where the adjustment needs to be done for 1)
increased firm level risk 2) contribution to systemic risk 3) 
contribution to risk for the real economy. 
• Impose penalty capital /liquidity requirements for firms with 
irresponsible compensation policies.
• Impose an industry wide moratorium on bonuses while firms are 
expected to replenish and build up their capital to the new levels 
expected under Basel III. This takes care of the collective action 
problem and allows authorities to limit bonuses more easily even
after the moratorium expires.
• Introduce limits on the year on year growth of the bonus pool 
consistent with the growth levels seen in the real economy.
• Calculate bonuses only after the maturity of the deal the bonus has 
been paid for 
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Way forward: Increasing the 
downside
• Force bankers to put their bonuses into an escrow account for the 
duration of a business cycle – at least ten years.
• Introduce claw back provisions, linked to losses experienced in the 
firm or the broader financial system that may be attributable to
excess risk taking. 
• Introduce strict civil and maybe even criminal penalties for 
negligence of duty in case employees are found to have taken on 
excessive risks that were personally beneficial but harmful for the 
society at large. 
• Introduce provisions against employees fired because of 
irresponsible risk taking so they are not able to work in the financial 
sector again.
• Link bonuses to subordinate debt? Cocos? 
• Introduce personal liability?
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Abstract 
The Capital Requirements Directive III attempts to align bank remuneration 
practices with effective risk management and prudential regulation. The UK has 
adopted a Revised Remuneration Code to implement the requirements of CRD III. 
Questions remain, however, regarding how far these regulatory reforms go in 
protecting the financial system and society against excessive financial risk-taking. 
CRD III is premised on the notion that there are agency problems in the 
remuneration practices of financial institutions. CRD III provides a prescriptive 
rules-based approach to regulating bonuses for senior executives and risk traders 
that creates complexity and limits effective disclosure to the market. Moreover, it 
does not address the moral hazard in limited liability corporate structures which 
incentivises shareholders to influence bank managers to take excessive risks. 
CRD III will probably do little to control excessive financial risk-taking and may 
also undermine the competitiveness of the EU and UK banking sector in globalised 
financial markets. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The structure of bank compensation was often designed to create incentives for traders 
to book short-term profits based on excessively risky behaviour which had the effect of 
increasing systemic risk in the financial system and weakening the bank’s medium and 
long-term prospects. Shareholders failed to provide adequate stewardship over bank 
senior management and risk-takers by allowing them to be compensated based on 
short-term revenue, rather than longer-term profitability. The EU Capital Requirements 
Directive III seeks to align the remuneration practices of banks and financial firms with 
effective risk management and prudential regulation. It does so largely with a 
prescriptive rules-based regime that attempts to reduce the agency problems in financial 
firm bonus practices that can lead to excessive risk-taking and poor firm performance.  
The paper analyses the main issues related to the UK‘s implementation of CRD III's 
variable remuneration requirements and discusses how these requirements may affect 
risk management and prudential regulation. Part 1 reviews the UK legislative and 
regulatory initiatives before adoption of CRD III, including the FSA‘s 2009 Remuneration 
Code and its overriding principle to link bank remuneration to effective risk management. 
It also discusses the relevant provisions of the UK Financial Services Act 2010 that 
authorise the FSA to regulate financial firm remuneration by restricting how bonuses are 
paid and adjusting remuneration based on firm performance. Part 1 also compares the 
UK‘s largely principles-based variable remuneration (bonus) requirements to the more 
prescriptive rules-based requirements of CRD III and shows how the FSA is implementing 
the CRD III requirements. Part 2 discusses some of the unintended effects of CRD III 
that may undermine its overall effectiveness. UK implementation of CRD III may result in 
remuneration rules becoming more complex, thereby making it more difficult for 
shareholders and other stakeholders to monitor financial institution’s remuneration 
practices. This limits effective disclosure by making remuneration more opaque and 
exacerbating agency problems. Moreover, the paper argues that CRD III does not 
address the moral hazard problems created by limited liability corporate structures in 
financial institutions that incentivise shareholders to influence managers and risk traders 
to take excessive balance sheet risks at the expense of creditors, depositors and 
customers. Part 2 then charts a path forward for UK remuneration regulation under the 
new UK supervisory regime. Although CRD III addresses some of the important agency 
problems in financial firm remuneration, its prescriptive nature and limited jurisdictional 
application to EU-based financial groups may lead to circumvention, greater risk-taking, 
and a loss of competiveness for the EU and UK financial sector.  
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1. UK REMUNERATION REGULATION BEFORE AND AFTER 
CRD III 
Major weaknesses in corporate governance at UK banks and financial institutions 
contributed significantly to the financial crisis. Specifically, the structure of bank 
compensation at UK banks created incentives for senior managers and traders to book 
short-term profits based on taking excessive risks that not only weakened the bank’s 
medium and long-term prospects but also increased systemic risk in the financial system. 
The predominant business ethos in the banking industry was based on generating higher 
revenues that led to higher cash bonuses that contributed to weaker bank performance 
at the expense of bank customers, depositors and long-term shareholders. 
UK policymakers and regulators failed to understand how the compensation 
arrangements of banks and other financial institutions drove excessive risk-taking and 
undermined effective risk management.  
1.1. UK legislative and regulatory initiatives on bank 
remuneration before CRD III 
In recent years, several studies have shown that executive compensation at the largest 
FTSE 100 companies and large UK banks and financial companies has increased at 
alarming levels.1 Even at the Royal Bank of Scotland – one of Britain’s largest banks 
which is 84% owned by the UK taxpayer - which collapsed in 2008 under the leadership 
of Sir Fred Goodwin, the RBS Board is considering whether to approve a £1 million bonus 
for its CEO Stephen Hester for 2011 that is in addition to his £1.2 million annual salary.2 
As UK economic growth stagnates in 2011, executive pay in FTSE 100 companies 
increased on average by 49% compared with just 2.7% for the average employee.3 
These gaps in remuneration between senior executives and the average employees of UK 
companies are extraordinary and have created a public backlash which is causing British 
politicians to look closely at whether high pay awards in the private sector 
should be restricted.  
Bank remuneration arrangements were identified as playing a significant role in 
contributing to excessive risk-taking by senior management and risk traders prior to the 
recent crisis. At the time, there was no express UK statutory authority for the Financial 
Services Authority to impose restrictions on the compensation practices of UK regulated 
institutions. Although the FSA had discretionary authority to impose requirements on 
regulated firms, including controls on compensation, as part of their Part 4 authorisation 
conditions under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, it followed a principles-
based regulatory approach that deferred to the discretion of management to decide 
remuneration structures and other risk controls so long as regulatory objectives appeared 
to be met. Firm remuneration structures were viewed by the FSA to be a matter for 
managerial discretion and contract law between firms and their employees.  
In November 2009, Sir David Walker published his review of UK bank corporate 
governance which contained, among other things, proposals on compensation standards 
for UK banks and financial firms.4 The Walker Review adopted 11 principles on 
remuneration that cover roles and responsibilities of remuneration committees, skills and 
experience of members, responsibility for approving and reviewing remuneration policy; 
                                                 
1 See THE HIGH PAY COMMISSION 2011, pp. 8–9.  
2 See Financial Times Leader, (20 Jan. 2012). 
3 THE HIGH PAY COMMISSION 2011, p. 9. 
4 Sir David Walker, The Walker Review (26 Nov. 2009) chap. 7 (compensation practices). 
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risk management input into the remuneration process; and incentive structures for 
‘high-end’ employees. Of particular importance was its proposal for retention periods for 
the vested benefits of senior executives and ‘high-end’ employees.5 The Walker Review’s 
principles influenced6 the FSA’s development of a Remuneration Code (the ‘Code’) in 
2009,7 which was later revised in 2010 to take account of changes brought about by 
CRD III.  
The FSA’s 2009 Code was designed to provide a flexible principles-based approach for 
developing remuneration structures that enhanced firm performance whilst achieving 
regulatory objectives. For instance, Principle 8 addressed remuneration structures for 
‘code staff’ of financial firms by providing legally non-binding guidance for how firms and 
their code staff should be classified in remuneration policies and the metrics used to 
assess their performance. FSA consultations revealed general satisfaction with the 
principles-based approach for classifying firms and their staff into risk categories before 
applying remuneration disciplines, but some firms expressed dissatisfaction with the lack 
of clarity regarding compliance and lack of consistency regarding firms posing similar 
risks.8 In 2010, the FSA adopted a Revised Remuneration Code containing more specific 
criteria for assessing remuneration policies that were aimed at implementing the more 
prescriptive rules-based requirements of CRD III.  
Before the Revised Code was adopted, the UK Parliament enacted the Financial Services 
Act 2010,9 which reinforced the 2009 Code’s key principles. Sections 4 to 6 of the Act 
contain a number of provisions concerning bank remuneration. The Act authorised the 
Treasury to adopt secondary legislation that delegated new powers and duties to the FSA 
to devise and enforce minimum standards on remuneration at regulated firms, including 
requiring firms to disclose remuneration-related matters. The FS Act 2010 also contained 
two provisions that required the Treasury to delegate powers to the FSA to prohibit 
employees (or groups of employees) from being remunerated in specific ways. 
Remuneration contracts that breach prohibitions or restrictions on types of remuneration 
adopted by the FSA under its Code can be rendered void. The other provision empowers 
the FSA to require the ‘recovery of any payments made, or other property transferred’ if 
such transfers are pursuant to contracts that are rendered void or which breach 
compensation requirements under the Code.10 
1.2. The FSA Remuneration Code and CRD III implementation 
CRD III generally requires that financial sector remuneration be aligned with effective 
risk management. It is premised primarily on the idea that there are agency problems in 
financial firm remuneration structures that incentivise managers and risk-takers to take 
excessive financial risks that reduce shareholder value and undermine financial stability. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. It states ‘[e]xecutive board members and ‘high end’ employees should be expected to maintain a 
shareholding or retain a portion of vested awards in an amount in line with their total compensation on a 
historic or expected basis, to be built up over a period at the discretion of the remuneration committee’ 
6 For example, the Walker Review’s recommendation on retention of vested benefits influenced the FSA to 
adopt a similar approach in the 2009 Code (Principle 8) and the FSA Handbook. 
7 The FSA Code was initially adopted based on the Financial Stability Board’s 2009 ‘Sound Principles on 
Compensation’ that sets forth principles for states to regulate pay and bonuses in order to prevent firm 
compensation structures from encouraging excessive risk-taking. 
8 The Financial Services Authority, Policy Statement, (December 2010). The FSA found that ‘[i]n last year’s 
[2009] implementation process, we found that the rules and guidance on remuneration structures presented 
the most challenges and so, following issuance of a supervisory framework to firms in December 2009, we are 
now proposing additional guidance [in 2010 pre-CRD III] on these key aspects.’ 
9 The Financial Services Act 2010 received the Royal Assent on 8 April 2010 and became effective on 8 June 
2010. 
10 The FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA) 2010a, nos. 2.4-2.6. 
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CRD III creates prescriptive rules that limit the cash element of upfront bonuses to a 
maximum of 30% of the total bonus, while limiting the cash element of large upfront 
bonuses to 20%. At least 50% of the total bonus must be paid in shares or equivalent 
instruments, and this should be applied equally to the deferred and non-deferred portions 
of the bonus. This means a banker receiving a £100k bonus could receive an upfront 
cash payment of £30k, but that would have to be matched (50/50) with £30k in upfront 
shares that would have to be retained over a period of time (not yet determined by the 
European Banking Authority). The deferred portion of the £100k bonus (£40k) could be 
received equally in cash (£20k) and shares (£20k) on a pro rata basis over a 3 year 
period beginning not before the third year following the receipt of the upfront bonus. This 
50%, 40%/60% formula aims to link bonus payments to longer term firm performance.  
Earlier, the FSA had taken the view that the reference in CRD III to the 50% requirement 
applies to variable remuneration as a whole. According to the FSA, firms should have had 
the discretion to decide whether shares could form part of the non-deferred payment, 
part of the deferred element, or a mixture of both. The EU Parliament Rapporteur, Arlene 
McCarthy MEP, however, interpreted the 50% requirement as applying equally to both 
the deferred and the non-deferred portions of the bonus. CEBS issued an interpretative 
guideline agreeing with the Rapporteur’s interpretation.  
The FSA has now implemented into the Revised Code and regulatory rules the 
CEBS/Parliament interpretation that the 50% variable remuneration rule should be 
applied equally to both the deferred and non-deferred portions of variable 
remuneration.11 The FSA, however, has stated that the 50% rule would increase 
compliance costs because of the rule’s complexity and that it would adversely affect UK 
competitiveness on a global basis because it might make it more difficult for British firms 
to compete for talented personnel.12 
The FSA has adopted the following provisions in its Handbook, which implement, in its 
view, the main requirements of the CRD III variable remuneration rules.  
'(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a 
substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less 
than three to five years. 
(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. 
(3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: 
(a) of a particularly high amount, or 
(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal 
organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities; at least 60% of the 
amount must be deferred. 
[…] 
(6) £500,000 is a particularly high amount for the purpose of (3)(a). 
(7) Paragraph (6) is without prejudice to the possibility of lower sums being considered a 
particularly high amount.'13 
Regarding subsections (3)(a) and (6) above, the FSA interpreted the CRD III requirement 
that 60% of a substantially high bonus must be deferred to mean that all bonuses in 
                                                 
11 The FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA) 2010b, Revising the Remuneration Code. Feedback on CP10/19 and 
final rules. PS 10/20. No 1.22-1.24. 
12 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA) 2010b, nos. 1.27. 
13 The FSA Handbook, SYSC, nos. 19A.3.49. 
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excess of $500,000 paid to code staff must be subject to 60% deferral. The FSA also 
allows discretion for firms to consider whether lesser amounts should be considered as 
‘particularly high’ taking account, for example, whether there are significant differences 
in the levels of variable remuneration paid to code staff within a firm. FSA expects firms 
to have a ‘firm-wide policy on deferment, subject to a de minimis rule, which includes a 
rising proportion of deferment according to the amount of variable remuneration.14 
The FSA recognises the CRD III principle of linking remuneration to instruments, such as 
shares, that reflect firm performance. For firms that are unable to issue shares, however, 
such as mutuals or building societies, the FSA observes that complications arise because 
of the difficulty issuing appropriate alternatives to shares and share-linked instruments. 
Moreover, the increased the use of shares and equivalent instruments as part of variable 
remuneration may affect the bank’s ability to comply with regulatory capital 
requirements. Principle 6 of the FSA’s Revised Code addresses this by stating ‘that the 
total variable compensation paid by the firm to all staff’ should not ‘limit its ability to 
strengthen its capital base’. Moreover, increased use of shares in variable remuneration 
may also significantly dilute existing shareholders, which may affect shareholder rights 
under EU company law.15  
1.1.1. Retention periods  
Regarding the portion of shares or share-equivalent instruments issued as upfront 
payment, CRD III requires firms to establish a retention programme stipulating minimum 
transfer retention periods. This is not the same as deferral: Retention periods apply to 
non-cash bonuses paid upfront or deferred awards that have vested. The FSA provides 
an example of how this would work: ‘if the level of deferral is greater than or equal to 
50% of variable remuneration, the firm can choose to issue the full deferred proportion 
as shares and this would meet the proposed share-based requirement. However, if the 
deferred shares amount to less than 50% of variable remuneration (e.g. 40% deferred), 
the remaining required portion (e.g. 10% upfront) should be allocated in shares or share-
equivalent instruments and subject to a retention period.’16  
The FSA believes that firms should have flexibility to adopt retention periods that are 
proportionate to the type of risks they face and has criticised any proposals to establish 
prescriptive retention periods and suggests that the market should decide as follows: 
‘Retention period – CRD3 states that variable remuneration issued in shares or 
other instruments should also be subject to an appropriate retention policy 
designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the firm. 
The CEBS guidelines do not specify a minimum retention period. However, 
CRD3 provides that the minimum retention period should be sufficient to align 
incentives with the longer term interests of the institution.’ (FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY (FSA) 2010b, nos. 2.50) 
CRD III also requires that bonuses paid as exceptional pension payments must be held in 
shares or equivalent instruments whose value is linked to the underlying value of the 
firm’s shares and profitability. Banks are required to establish binding bonus-to-salary 
ratios with regulatory approval and remuneration committees whose membership 
consists wholly of outside, independent directors. Each financial firm must publish the 
details of its salaries and bonuses in order to enhance transparency for shareholders and 
                                                 
14 The FSA Handbook, SYSC 19.3.47R (2) a)(d). 
15 Ibid. The FSA also observed that it wants to be satisfied that the instruments firms use to meet this 
requirement are eligible as Tier 1 capital requirements. 
16 FSA Consultation paper (July 2010). 
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provide benchmarks for regulators to monitor how remuneration affects firm risk-taking 
and performance.  
1.1.2. Scope of application  
The FSA relied on the Financial Stability Board’s 2009 recommendations that financial 
sector compensation regulation should only apply to large banks and investment firms. 
Accordingly, the FSA 2009 Code applied only to a limited number of large joint-stock 
company UK banks and financial firms. CRD III, however, expands the scope of 
application to all banks, building societies, and investment firms to which the Market in 
Financial Instruments Directive applies. In the Revised 2010 Code, the FSA has now 
expanded its scope of application to over 2,500 regulated financial firms in the United 
Kingdom.17  
The Code’s intensity of application to these firms, however, will depend on the firm’s size, 
the nature of risk-taking, and complexity and inter-connectedness of the firm or 
institution in financial markets. In this regard, the FSA considers the proportionality 
principle – mandated by CRD III - to be important in determining the precise application 
of CRD III’s more prescriptive rules-based framework to these firm’s remuneration 
policies.  
1.1.3. De minimis rule and the proportionality principle  
The FSA will apply a de minimis exclusionary rule for determining what type of variable 
rate bonuses should be excluded from its disciplines. The FSA’s 2009 Code and its 
supervisory framework specified that a de minimis exclusion would apply to its deferral 
requirements for code employees who earned under £500,000 per annum and whose 
bonuses were less than 25% of total remuneration. This was part of the FSA’s approach 
to proportionality. Under the 2010 Code and Handbook, the FSA has expanded its de 
minimis rule to exclude code staff whose total remuneration is equal to or less than 
£500,000 and whose bonuses are less than 33% of total remuneration from the rules 
covering: deferral, performance adjustment, proportion of remuneration paid in shares, 
and guaranteed bonuses.18  
1.1.4. Performance adjustment  
CRD III requires that firms should be able to make adjustments to the unvested deferred 
amounts of an individual’s variable remuneration, provided that the firm communicates 
beforehand its intention to the employee. This ex post ‘performance adjustment’ should 
reflect actual firm performance as it materialises over time, and may, as a result of poor 
firm or individual performance, lead to a reduction in the deferred unvested award. The 
objective is to develop incentives where high-end risk-takers are focused on longer-term 
firm performance and are accountable to shareholders. Firms are required to design and 
implement performance adjustment schemes to establish a credible, effective link 
between the individual’s remuneration and the future riskiness of the activities already 
undertaken.  
The FSA distinguishes between ex post adjustments to deferred variable remuneration 
that have not yet vested (known as ‘malus’) and ex ante adjustments to variable 
remuneration that is already vested, but which the individual agrees in advance to repay 
(known as ‘clawback’) if certain conditions occur. The FSA’s performance adjustment 
powers are codified in section 6 of the FS Act 2010, which provides that the FSA can 
‘render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes’ a prohibition or restriction 
                                                 
17 See FSA Handbook, Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms. 
18 FSA Handbook, SYSC 19.3.6. FSA Consultation Paper, (July, 2010), para. 3.79. 
PE 464.465 58 
Workshop Implementation of Banks' Remuneration Rules (CRD III) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
on remuneration under the Act and ‘provide for the recovery of payments made, or 
property transferred, in pursuance of a void provision.’ The FSA has specified conditions 
under which it will exercise this power, but only in relation to code staff, for both ex ante 
and ex post performance adjustment19 and to impose restrictions on guaranteed 
bonuses.20 CRD III has led the FSA to give more precision to its clawback powers by 
providing in the FSA Handbook that where it exercises its ‘voiding powers’ for a particular 
contract, the regulated firm ‘will be obliged to recover payments made or property 
transferred to the individual’, and that ‘[a] payment made in breach of [the] rule would 
be void and must be recovered.’21 
                                                 
19 See FSA Handbook (deferral arrangements), SYSC 19.3.46R. 
20 See FSA Handbook (guaranteed bonuses), SYSC 19.3.38R. 
21 FSA Handbook, SYSC 19 Annex 1 5R and SYSC 19 Annex 1 7R. In situations where the firm is unable to 
clawback cash or property the Handbook further states that the ‘[f]irm would be restricted from making further 
variable remuneration awards to the individual in respect of the same performance year unless they have legal 
advice that the award complies with the Code.’ 
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2. CRD III – UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND 
CHALLENGES  
2.1. UK bank compensation trends  
Despite the UK’s regulatory and legislative reforms, senior executive pay – both fixed and 
variable compensation - continues to grow rapidly – particularly at banks and other 
financial institutions – out of proportion to the growth of average wages of UK workers 
and even mid-level employees in the UK financial services sector. In 2011, the most 
senior executives at Barclays earned 75 times more than the average compensation of a 
Barclays’ employee.22 Barclays’ 75 to 1 ratio was considerably higher than its ratio in 
1979 in which the most senior executives earned only 14.5 times more than the average 
compensation of a Barclays’ employee. Between 1979 and 2011, senior executive 
compensation at Barclays has risen by 4,899.4% – from £87,323 to a staggering 
£4,365,636.23 
2.2. CRD III challenges: complexity and disclosure  
The regulation of remuneration in the financial sector has contributed to increasing 
complexity in compensation packages. Despite the FSA’s objective of more transparency 
in relation to executive pay, it has become more difficult for shareholders and other 
stakeholders to understand the criteria and rules that determine executive and senior 
management compensation at financial institutions and firms. This has resulted in a 
situation where only relatively few individuals with technical insight are able to 
understand what an executive is being paid. Indeed, the UK High Pay Commission has 
observed that 'despite legislation designed to increase transparency in relation to 
executive pay, the issue remains murky to say the least.'24 This has had the unintended 
effect of limiting or reducing transparency in compensation practices in the financial 
sector. 
Enhanced disclosure also remains a challenge under the CRD III and FSA Code. Indeed, 
the requirement of disclosure is an important part of CRD III, but according to Sir David 
Walker disclosure is not enough. Sir David has observed that 'while the European Union’s 
new Capital Requirements Directive is highly prescriptive on other areas of bank 
remuneration, it does not require disclosure of high-end salary bands.'  
According to Sir David, this has resulted in shareholders of EU financial firms ignoring the 
big picture issue of how many senior bank managers and risk-takers fall into certain 
high-end salary categories, yet imposing very prescriptive regulatory provisions on 
remuneration as a whole. It is argued that ‘if shareholders took a closer and more 
broadly based interest in remuneration, the regulatory pendulum would not need to 
swing so far.’ (Walker, 2010) The right amount of disclosure would make the other 
requirements of CRD III unnecessary. Indeed, by disclosing bands of remuneration, 
shareholders and stakeholders would have the ability to compare and benchmark 
remuneration patterns and to have more relevant information about the type of 
compensation for those higher paid senior managers and risk takers whose performance 
has the greatest impact on the bank’s risk profile and long-term performance.  
Disclosure requirements which vary from country to country (as they do in the EU) will 
limit and restrict the ability of shareholders and regulators to compare the type and level 
                                                 
22 UK THE HIGH PAY COMMISSION 2011, pp. 8–9. 
23 Ibid. 
24 THE HIGH PAY COMMISSION 2011, p. 41. 
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of compensation between similar banking institutions. They may also lead to regulatory 
arbitrage. In the case of the UK, the requirement for banded disclosure for UK banks and 
the non-EU foreign subsidiaries of UK-controlled banking groups does not also apply to 
non-UK based banks, which creates a regulatory cost advantage for foreign institutions 
vis-a-vis their UK competitors. This could also lead to higher executive turnover at UK 
institutions with the unintended consequence that UK institutions would adopt much 
higher remuneration – both fixed and variable – ‘as a defensive retention measure.’ 
(WALKER 2010) 
As discussed above, CRD III requires that 50% of the non-deferred and deferred bonuses 
be paid in shares, and that the deferred portion can only be paid in cash on a pro rata 
basis over a 3-to-5 year period. The UK High Pay Commission, however, criticised this 
requirement on variable pay and instead recommended that bonuses should consist only 
‘of shares, the value of which is determined by the remuneration committee, with a five-
year initial holding period and then a timed vesting of 20% each year as the preferred 
option. Although other performance-related-pay options are available, we feel this is the 
simplest way of linking the interests of the executive to the shareholder. This 
simplification could also act to limit tax evasion and avoidance.’25  
2.3. The Way Forward – the role of shareholder stewardship?  
The CRD III and FSA Code have not adequately addressed the substantial moral hazard 
problem in the limited liability corporate structures of banks and certain investment firms 
that creates an incentive for shareholders to encourage management and risk traders 
(‘code staff’) to take excessive risks. Prior to the crisis, large institutional shareholders 
and board members were often complicit in decisions by senior management that led to 
excessive risk-taking, which put depositors’ and customers’ money at great risk. Many of 
these investors did not consider themselves to be stewards of the company’s long-term 
profitability and performance, but rather were focused on the firm’s short-term revenues 
and risk-adjusted return on equity. Shareholders stood to lose only the value of their 
equity investment, but could potentially reap huge gains if bank management took 
greater risks by, for instance, increasing leverage.  
The alignment of interests between large institutional shareholders who were seeking 
greater risk-adjusted returns on which they could trade profitably over the short-term 
and senior management and risk traders who were pressured by large shareholders to 
take greater risks to increase short-term revenues while being rewarded with lavish cash 
bonuses created moral hazard that eventually caused the financial system to collapse. 
This type of moral hazard problem is not addressed by CRD III and the FSA Code.  
The two new UK regulators - the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial 
Conduct Authority – will have an opportunity to address these problems when they begin 
exercising their powers in early 2013. It is suggested that they exercise their powers to 
ensure that remuneration in the financial sector is linked to the long-term profitability of 
regulated financial firms, while ensuring effective risk management in those firms that 
protects other stakeholders in society against the social costs of excessive risk-taking. In 
doing so, the regulators should require that directors have the knowledge and incentives 
to question the firm’s business and risk models and how they affect not only earnings 
and shareholder returns but also the impact of the firm’s risk-taking on the broader 
financial system. However, the code should also require that bank management instil a 
new cultural ethos in bankers that emphasises sustainable investments and a duty of 
care to protect customers’ interests. Also, effective shareholder stewardship requires not 
                                                 
25 THE HIGH PAY COMMISSION 2011, p. 48. 
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only an alignment of interests between shareholders and senior executives and risk-
takers, but also an alignment between shareholders and other stakeholders in society, 
such as customers, depositors, and employees. 
CONCLUSION 
The financial crisis demonstrates how bank and financial sector remuneration practices 
led to risky business models and excessive risk-taking, thereby resulting in bank failures 
and state bailouts. UK policymakers responded to these concerns by adopting the 2009 
Compensation Code which set forth a principles-based regime requiring greater 
disclosure and the alignment of remuneration policies with effective risk management 
and long-term firm performance. The Financial Services Act 2010 reinforced the FSA’s 
legal powers to require enhanced disclosure of remuneration practices, restricting how 
bonuses are paid, and allowing firms to ‘clawback’ money or property already paid to 
code staff who are in breach of performance adjustment rules. The FSA Revised Code 
2010 aims to implement the CRD III remuneration requirements. CRD III creates a 
prescriptive rules-based regime for bonus structures and related remuneration practices. 
The FSA reluctantly agreed to implement the CRD III’s bonus requirements with respect 
to the 50% and 40/60% rule on the grounds that it would increase compliance costs and 
weaken UK competitiveness. CRD III has attracted much criticism on the grounds of 
complexity that would lead to less effective disclosure. Moreover, CRD III fails to address 
the moral hazard problem inherent in the limited liability structure of most large financial 
institutions that incentivise excessive risk-taking at the expense firm performance. The 
new UK supervisory regime will continue to face substantial challenges in implementing 
CRD III.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The existing structure of executive remuneration packages has encouraged excessive risk-
taking by employees. This has been acknowledged as one of the main drivers of the crisis.1 
Moreover, despite financial uncertainty in the financial sector, CEOs and traders of some 
troubled banks received generous bonuses and other financial benefits, which provoked 
massive public indignation. In order to tackle this issue, a new legal framework has been 
established, both at EU and global level. 
On 29 February 2009, the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by 
Jacques de Larosière, issued its Report stating inter alia the need to revise remuneration 
policies.2 A few days later in London, G-20 leaders endorsed the Financial Stability Forum's 
(FSF, now Financial Stability Board, FSB) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices. The 
initiative was strongly supported at EU level and in April 2009, the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS, now European Banking Authority, EBA) published their High 
Level Principles on Remuneration Policies and the European Commission issued its 
Recommendations on remuneration policies in the financial services sector. 
Pursuing further the aim of establishing a strengthened legal framework for supervision of 
remuneration structures, the Commission adopted its proposal for amending Directive 
2006/48/EC regarding new remuneration rules in July 2009, which was adopted by Council 
and European Parliament in November 2010. In the meanwhile, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) published the Compensation Principles and Standards 
Assessment Methodology to guide supervisory bodies in reviewing financial institutions' 
compensation policies and assessing their compliance with the FSB principles and 
standards. Supplementary Guidelines on Remuneration Practices were issued by CEBS (now 
EBA) in December 2010. 
In November 2011, the FSB presented the latest peer report on implementation and 
efficiency of the new remuneration rules. The FSB peer review claims that the changes in 
corporate culture and managerial behaviour will have visible results in the long term. 
According to the findings, certain shortcomings of the remuneration principles were 
discovered, and the FSB has already provided financial institutions with new 
recommendations on implementation.  
At EU level the Commission is in charge of reviewing the rules on remuneration policy 
regarding their efficiency, implementation and enforcement. The relevant articles should be 
examined taking into account developments on international level including any further 
proposals from the FSB. This should be done via a review which is due by 1 April 2013. 
                                                 
1 Danthine Jean-Pierre, speech: After the crisis – improving incentives in the financial sector, 20 May 2011. 
2 All documents mentioned in this background note are linked in the reference part at the end. 
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1. GENERAL OVERVIEW: THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE 
REMUNERATION 
As a general rule, CEO remuneration3 is often composed of 20% base salary and of 80% 
performance-based pay. Executive compensation is not only about cash and stocks, but it 
also includes executive benefits and perquisites. The composition of executive pay is 
presented in table 1. 
Interestingly enough, there are certain differences in European and US compensation 
schemes for executive staff. According to the study 'Executive Compensation Controversy: 
A Transatlantic Analysis' by M. Conyon, European CEOs receive in general: 
 50% of their annual pay in the form of cash salary (compared to 30% in the USA) 
 19% of annual pay in form of equity and stock pay (compared to 46% in the USA) 
 75% of their annual pay in salaries and bonuses, however, bonuses depend less on 
shareholder return, accounting performance, or sales increase. 
Table 1. Structure of executive remuneration 
Basic elements of executive compensation 
Salary (base payment) for the core role and responsibilities of the day-to-day running 
of the organisation 
Short-term incentives or bonuses for meeting annual performance objectives 
Long-term incentive payments for meeting performance objectives to be achieved 
for a two- to five-year period.  
Restricted stock awards as an incentive to assure the executives are strongly aligned 
with the interests of shareholders. 
Stock options and stock appreciation rights for increasing share price and 
increasing the shareholders' returns.  
Supplemental executive retirement plans, which may keep the executive whole 
(that is, make up the difference) or better from a tax regulation 
Insurance plans (ex. golden parachute) that provide a source of retirement income 
and a richer death benefit to the executive's family. 
Paid expenses (perquisites) and other compensation for various programs or 
negotiated deals; can include some very large amounts for items such as loan 
forgiveness, special insurance programs, relocation expenses, etc.  
Source: Table based on the article 'Executive Compensation' by Bill Coleman 
                                                 
3 In this document, the terms 'remuneration' and 'compensation' are considered as being synonymic and imply all 
kinds of assets received by executives of a company for their services. It is worth noting that EU institutions 
commonly use the term 'remuneration', while 'compensation' is used by international organisations (FSB, BCBS) 
and in the USA.  
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The Financial Times has published data on CEO total pay of the world's biggest banks in 
2008-2010. More than half of these banks either were bailed out, or benefited from other 
state aid tools (asset relief, guarantee schemes, etc.). However, not all of them adjusted 
their remuneration policy according to the financial state of the bank (table 2). 
Table 2. Executive Total Pay in 2008-2010 
Total pay, USD Change, % Bank 
2008 2009 2010 2008-2009 2009-2010 
Wells Fargo 9 041 087 18 756 172 17 568 387 107,5 -6,0 
Credit Suisse 2 640 569 17 684 443 11 807 725 569,7 -33,0 
Deutsche bank 2 033 342 13 280 770 8 548 380 553,1 -19,0 
Royal Bank of Scotland n/a 10 036 855 11 537 346 n/a 15,0 
BVVA 7 819 725 8 954 596 8 070 985 14,5 -10,0 
HSBC 16 781 061 8 850 592 8 980 695 -47,3 1,0 
Unicredit 15 979 470 6 012 236 n/a -62,4 n/a 
Intesa Sanpaolo 4 479 075 5 298 943 5 048 351 18,3 -5,0 
Lloyd Banking group 9 235 174 4 976 605 8 367 953 -46,1 68,0 
Barclays 9 244 674 1 751 403 5 945 946 -81,1 239,0 
Societe Generale n/a 1 552 526 2 323 917 n/a 50,0 
BNP Paribas 5 726 857 
(1 453 740)* 
3 435 108 3 530 624 -74,6 3,0 
JPMorgan Chase 35 716 101 1 265 708 20 776 324 -96,5 1 541,0 
Morgan Stanley 1 235 097 939 241 14 854 049 -24 1 481,5 
Goldman Sachs 40 946 646 862 657 14 114 080 -97,9 1 536,0 
Citigroup 38 237 437 128 751 n/a -99,7 n/a 
Bank of America Merrill 9 003 467 32 171 1 220 234 -99,6 142,9 
Source: Financial Times 2010 and 2011. Compilation of figures derived from interactive graphic: Bank CEO pay 
2009,4 2010.5 
Note: For each CEO, total annual pay includes base salary, cash bonuses, the grant-date value of stock and 
option awards, and certain other benefits. The data was collected from the annual report of each company. 
* The figure for the CEO of BNP Paribas was revised in 2011.  
 
This is why, when the global financial crisis started, executive remuneration, especially in 
the financial sector, became the subject of massive public attention and scrutiny. It was 
generally acknowledged that 'unwisely' designed remuneration policies in financial 
institutions - especially at large banks - were a key contributing factor to the global 
financial crisis, as they encouraged excessive risk-taking that was inappropriate to the loss-
absorption capacity of credit institutions and of the financial sector as a whole.6 In order to 
address this issue, certain measures regarding strengthening of the prudential oversight on 
the executive remuneration were undertaken.  
                                                 
4 Bank CEO Pay 2009, Financial Times newspaper, 22 August 2010. 
5 Bank CEO Pay 2010, Financial Times newspaper, 14 June 2011. 
6 Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices, CEBS, point 1. 
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2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The creation of the new legal framework on remuneration policies started in the early 
spring of 2009. This initiative has been taken at both global and national level; including by 
G-20, BCBS, and FSB. Within the European Union, the Commission, EBA and national 
supervisors are involved. 
Timeline 1: Establishment of the legal framework - Main events 
07/10/201130/04/2009
20/04/200925/02/2009
02/04/2009
24/11/2010 29/07/201113/07/2009
22/01/2010 10/12/2010
Publication of the 
de Larosiere 
report
CRD III 
adoptionCRD III 
proposal 
CEBS issues High 
Level Principles on 
Remuneration Policies
G20 endorses FSF 
Principles for Sound 
Compensation 
Practices
Commission publishes 
Recommendations 
on remuneration 
policies in the financial 
services sector
BCBS publishes 
the Compensation 
Principles and 
Standards 
Assessment 
Methodology
CEBS releases 
Guidelines on 
Remuneration Policies 
and Practices
EBA (CEBS) publishes 
Guidelines for Data 
Collection on Bank 
Remuneration Policies
FSB presents 
the latest peer 
review
 
2.1. Global Level 
2.1.1. G-20 
First decisive measures regarding stricter regulation on remuneration policies were taken 
by the G-20 leaders on 2 April 2009 in London where the Declaration on Strengthening the 
Financial System was adopted. Besides the decision to improve the quality, quantity, and 
international consistency of capital in the banking system, the Declaration claims calls for 
the creation of sustainable compensation schemes through implementation of the Principles 
on Sound Compensation Practice developed by the Financial Stability Forum.7 
2.1.2. Financial Stability Forum (FSF) / Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
Given the issue of incentives towards excessive risk taking that may arise from the ill 
conceived compensation rules, the objective of the FSF's Principles on Sound Compensation 
Practices is to promote prudent remuneration policies through adjusting compensations 
according to all types of risk, risk outcomes and the time horizon of risk. Any compensation 
scheme must work along with other management tools in pursuit of prudent risk taking. 
The Principles for Sound Compensation Practices apply to large financial institutions, and 
they are crucial for significant, systemically important firms. Given the importance of the 
Principles, they are to be implemented by financial institutions. The implementation and 
adherence will be reinforced through supervisory reviews and intervention at the national 
level.  
                                                 
7 The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is the predecessor of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that has been 
established upon the G-20 Leaders Summit in April 2009. 'The FSB is an international body that has been created 
to coordinate the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop 
and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. It aims to 
bring together national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centres, 
international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and 
committees of central bank experts.' The FSB includes all G-20 major economies, FSF members, and the European 
Commission; information taken from http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/wssb.htm. 
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Box 1. FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (April, 2009) 
 
'- Effective governance of compensation: 
1. The firm’s board of directors must actively oversee the compensation system’s 
design and operation. 
2. The firm’s board of directors must monitor and review the compensation 
system to ensure the system operates as intended 
3. Staff engaged in financial and risk control must be independent, have 
appropriate authority, and be compensated in a manner that is independent of the 
business areas they oversee and commensurate with their key role in the firm. 
- Effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk taking: 
4. Compensation must be adjusted for all types of risk 
5. Compensation outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes. 
6. Compensation payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks. 
7. The mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation must be consistent 
with risk alignment. 
- Effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders: 
8. Supervisory review of compensation practices must be rigorous and sustained, 
and deficiencies must be addressed promptly with supervisory action. 
9. Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their 
compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders.' 
 
In October 2011 the FSB published a peer review of the recommendation implementation 
by member countries and organisations. The peer review found that supervisory authorities 
and financial firms in FSB member jurisdictions have made good progress in implementing 
the Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology, as many national 
authorities have adopted the necessary legislation, supervisory control has strengthened, 
and the governance of compensation schemes at firms has improved. However, it was 
stated that more work is required to fully implement the principles and standards by 
individual national authorities, to address concerns regarding possible competition 
distortions in the market for highly skilled employees, and eventually achieve sound 
compensation practices. 
Given the purpose of achieving lasting change in behaviour and culture within firms, the 
peer review stresses that more time is needed to develop common supervisory 
understanding; besides the implementation process of new compensation policies has to be 
effective and consistent. Regardless the full implementation of compensation principles by 
some companies, it was concluded to be too early for evaluation of their effectiveness in 
with regard to firms' behaviour and risk-taking incentives of employees. 
In view of the findings of the peer review, the FSB has set out certain recommendations on 
advancement in the implementation of the Principles and Standards by both national 
supervisory authorities and financial companies. 
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Box 2: List of FSB recommendations8 
'Recommendation 1 - Full implementation by national authorities  
(a) All FSB member jurisdictions should finalise the implementation of the P&S. Jurisdictions should 
undertake actions, including legislation where needed, to eliminate any impediments to full 
implementation. 
(b) Proportionality in the implementation of the P&S may be justified by the business model and risk 
profile of the institution. FSB member jurisdictions should clearly define in national regulations or 
supervisory guidance the specific criteria supporting the application of the principle of proportionality. 
In addition, jurisdictions should proactively ensure that proportionality remains appropriate and does 
not give rise to regulatory arbitrage as a result of market developments and emerging risks. 
(c) National authorities should periodically report to the FSB on the nature of any significant 
impediments and proposed actions to address them as well as on the specific criteria supporting the 
application of proportionality in their jurisdiction. This reporting will form part of the FSB’s ongoing 
monitoring of the implementation of the P&S. 
Recommendation 2 – Addressing level playing field concerns 
National supervisors should work bilaterally to verify and, as needed, address specific level playing 
field concerns raised by their respective institutions, particularly with regard to the implementation of 
Standards 6-9, 11 and 14. The nature of the concerns, the actions taken to address them via 
supervisory cooperation and the outcomes should be reported at least annually to the FSB and should 
inform the scope and intensity of its ongoing monitoring of the implementation of the P&S. 
Recommendation 3 – Ongoing implementation monitoring 
The FSB should undertake ongoing monitoring and public reporting on the implementation of the P&S 
as part of its coordinated framework for monitoring the implementation of agreed G20/FSB financial 
reforms. This monitoring should focus on remaining gaps and impediments to full implementation by 
member jurisdictions as well as on the actions taken by relevant parties in response to this report’s 
recommendations. Based on the findings from the ongoing monitoring, the FSB should consider the 
scope and appropriate timing for a follow-up peer review on compensation practices as well as any 
decision to issue additional FSB guidance on the interpretation of the definition of material risk takers. 
Recommendation 4 – Supervisory cooperation 
Supervisory cooperation in the area of compensation practices should be stepped up. Greater efforts 
need to be made to include remuneration on the agenda of supervisory colleges and to enhance 
home-host supervisory cooperation and coordination for significant, cross-border financial institutions. 
In order to enhance the effectiveness and consistency of implementation of the P&S, supervisors 
should use appropriate supervisory networks to exchange information on the interpretation and 
technical implementation of the P&S in their jurisdiction, including with respect to the definition of 
material risk takers. They should also discuss evolving firm practices, especially in the areas of risk 
adjustment and performance alignment. 
Recommendation 5 – Effective governance of compensation 
Supervisors should ensure that all financial institutions deemed significant for the purposes of the 
P&S take immediate steps to align their practices with the key requirements in the area of effective 
governance of compensation. Particular attention should be given to the independence and expertise 
of the institution’s remuneration committee, to the independence of risk and compliance functions in 
the compensation process, and to evidence of real cultural change within the institution. 
Recommendation 6 – Disclosure 
Supervisors should ensure that all financial institutions deemed significant for the purposes of the 
P&S comply with the Basel Committee’s Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration from 1 
January 2012.' 
                                                 
8 2011 Thematic Review on Compensation, 7 October 2011, FSB.  
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2.1.3. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
In January 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued its 
Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology. The purpose of the 
Methodology is two-fold: first, to guide supervisors in reviewing compensation practices 
and assessing their compliance with the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
and their implementation standards; and second, prevent possible competition distortions 
and to provide supervisory approaches in promoting prudent remuneration rules at 
significant financial institutions. The assessment methodology defines supervisory review 
framework with regard to the three issues addressed by the FSB Principles:  
(i) effective governance of compensation,   
(ii) effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking, and   
(iii) effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders.  
The BCSB provides various approaches for each of the FSB Principles and Standards; as 
well the assessment methodology advises supervisors on information that could be used in 
conducting examinations. 
 
2.2. EU Level 
2.2.1. European Commission 
On 25 February 2009, the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU chaired by 
Jacques de Larosière issued its Report giving recommendations for reforming the European 
financial supervision and regulation. In this report, special attention is paid to executive 
compensation, and it is stated that 'compensation incentives should be better aligned with 
shareholder interests and long-term profitability'. Therefore, the structure of financial 
sector compensation schemes should be based on the following principles 
(Recommendation 11):  
 'The assessment of bonuses should be set in a multi-year framework, spreading 
bonus payments over the cycle; 
 The same principles should apply to proprietary traders and asset managers; 
 Bonuses should reflect actual performance and not be guaranteed in advance.' 
Moreover, it was advised that 'supervisors should oversee the suitability of financial 
institutions' compensation policies, require changes where compensation policies encourage 
excessive risk-taking and, where necessary, impose additional capital requirements under 
pillar 2 of Basel 2 in case no adequate remedial action is being taken.'9 
On 30 April 2009, following the initiative of the G-20 leaders and the conclusions of the de 
Larosière report, the European Commission adopted its 'Recommendations on remuneration 
policies in the financial services sector'.  
In July 2009, the European Commission issued a proposal for a directive amending the 
Directive 2006/48/EC regarding strengthening of prudential regulation of the compensation 
structures and enabling supervisory authorities to impose capital 'sanctions' on financial 
institutions the remuneration policies of which are found to generate unacceptable risk. 
The proposed Directive (CRD III) was adopted on 24 November 2010. 
                                                 
9 Report of the de Larosière Group, p.31. 
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2.2.2. The European Parliament 
On 7 July 2010, the European Parliament issued its resolution on remuneration of directors 
of listed companies and remuneration policies in the financial services sector 
(2010/2009(INI)). The European Parliament strongly supported the initiative taken by the 
Commission and the FSB. The resolution was adopted by 594 votes to 24, with 35 
abstentions. 
Briefly, the resolution supports the ideas that:  
 supervisory bodies should take a decision on creation of a remuneration committee 
within a credit institution or a listed company, and that they should do so with 
regard to its size, internal structure, complexity and the nature of its activities; 
 the remuneration committee determines the remuneration policy of a financial 
institution or a listed company, and it must have access to the subject matter of 
contracts; 
 compensation packages should be aligned with adequate risk-taking and have 
balanced structure; 
 remuneration schemes should be reasonable with regard to the size, internal 
organisation and complexity of credit institutions; 
 supervisory bodies should be empowered with the right of prudential oversight, 
including penalties for non-observation; stakeholders should more involved in 
endorsement of bonuses. 
2.2.3. The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
The predecessor of the European Banking Authority (EBA), i.e. the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors published on 20 April 2009 a set of High-level Principles for 
Remuneration Policies (HLP). Based on FSF Principles, the HLP pursued the same objective, 
i.e. optimisation of remuneration policies. 
The scope of the HLP covers and focuses on: 
 remuneration policies applying throughout an organisation, 
 key aspects including the alignment of company and individual objectives; 
 governance with respect to oversight and decision-making;  
 performance measurement;  
 and forms of remuneration. 
Following-up on the HLP, the new EBA was tasked to issue guidelines on sound 
remuneration policies which had to comply with the principles included in the amended 
Annex V of CRD. From Q4 2009 until Q1 2010, EBA conducted a comprehensive study on 
the implementation of the HLP,10 both by national supervisors and by financial institutions. 
The main findings were used as input for the guidelines and were officially published on 
11 June 2010. 
The Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices were issued by EBA in December 
2010. The objective of the guidance is to guarantee proper application of the new 
approaches to remuneration policies in the financial sector, and to prevent anti-competitive 
behaviour amongst financial firms, especially with a view to keeping claims on 
proportionality - both from supervisors and institutions. The EBA guidelines addressed not 
                                                 
10 Report on national implementation of CEBS High-level principles for Remuneration Policies, June 2010. 
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only executive remuneration policies in institutions, but also the everyday remuneration 
rules and procedures through which the policy is implemented. 
A further step in regulating executive compensations was taken on 28 July 2011, when EBA 
published two consultation papers on guidelines for data collection on bank remuneration 
practices.11 The consultation was closed on 2 September 2011. According to EBA results, 
respondents supported the proposed Guidelines and appreciated that they were developed 
based on the international standards issued by the FSB. It was mentioned that the crucial 
issue during the crisis was not a lack of legislative rules 'but a lack of effective 
implementation of these rules'.12 
 
2.2.4. Review 
According to Article 156 of the Directive 2006/48/EC, 'by 1 April 2013, the Commission 
should review the principles on remuneration policy with particular regard to their 
efficiency, implementation and enforcement, taking into account international 
developments including any further proposals from the FSB and the implementation of the 
FSB principles in other jurisdictions including the link between the design of variable 
remuneration and excessive risk-taking behaviour.'  
                                                 
11 Consultation Paper 'Draft on Remuneration data collection exercise regarding high earners' and Consultation 
Paper Draft 'On the remuneration benchmarking exercise', 28 July 2011. 
12 EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance, 27 September 2011, p. 5 point 12. 
PE 464.465 75 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. THE AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC (CRD III) 
3.1. Proposal of the Commission (CRD III) 
The final proposal COM(2009)0362 was released on 13 July 2009. Apart from the new rules 
on compensation policy, the proposal also included changes to legislation on trading books 
and securitisation provisions.  
The stated objectives of the proposed amendments to the CRD concerning remuneration 
were: 
 'to impose a binding obligation on credit institutions and investment firms to have 
remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and 
effective risk management, accompanied by high level principles on sound 
remuneration; 
 to bring remuneration policies within the scope of the supervisory review under the 
CRD, so that supervisors would be able to require the firm to take measures to 
rectify any problems that they might identify; 
 to ensure that supervisors may also impose financial or non-financial penalties 
(including fines) against firms that fail to comply with the obligation'. 
The proposed obligation should apply to remuneration for staff whose professional activities 
have a material impact on the risk profile of the bank or investment firm and for those 
individuals who take decisions that may affect the level of risk assumed by the institution. 
According to assessment conducted by the European Commission13, the impact of the 
proposed amendments to remuneration policies would be the following: 
 credit institutions and investment firms will have remuneration policies that are 
consistent with effective risk management; 
 the rate of compliance by credit institutions and investment firms will increase; 
 credit institutions and investment firms will get the flexibility to comply with the new 
obligation and high level principles in a way that is appropriate to their size and 
internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities; 
 minimisation of the up-front and on-going compliance costs for firms. 
According to the results of public consultation (from 29 April until 6 May 2009), the 
majority of respondents expressed support for the principle that remuneration policies 
within the banking sector which should be consistent with sound and effective risk 
management, and were of the view that this should be brought within the scope of 
supervisory review under the CRD.14 
CRD III introduced two tasks for national supervisory authorities as well as for the EBA, 
relating to data collection on remuneration practices. In summary, the tasks are: 
- collection of aggregate quantitative information on remuneration (broken down by 
business areas) and  
                                                 
13 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive amending Capital 
Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies, Impact Assessment 
SEC(2009) 974 final of 13 July 2009. 
14 Commission Proposal for Directive COM(2009) 362 final, 13 July 2009, p. 4. 
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- collection of information on the number of individuals per credit institution in pay 
brackets of EUR 1 million and above.  
To support these two tasks the EBA, after discussion with its Banking Stakeholder Group, is 
proposing two guideline documents for a common approach across the EU on remuneration 
data collection, via templates to be used by financial institutions for reporting to their 
national supervisors. 
3.2. Adoption of the amending directive 
Directive 2010/76/EU (amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital 
requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of 
remuneration policies) was adopted 24 November 2010. 
According to this Directive, the CEBS/EBA shall adopt guidelines on sound remuneration 
policies. Also, national prudential oversight bodies are in charge of checking whether the 
remuneration policies and practices are consistent with sound risk management given the 
nature of the firm's business. In case of breach of legislation, the supervisory body in 
charge has a right to apply financial and non-financial sanctions: 
 qualitative measures (requirement for the firm to rectify the situation by changing 
its remuneration structure to reduce the inherent risk) 
 quantitative measures (requirement for the firm to hold additional own funds against 
the risk) to address those problems.  
The relevant provisions regarding remuneration (including the amendments made to the 
Directive) are copied in the Annex to this document. 
 
PE 464.465 77 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF CRD III REMUNERATION RULES 
IN MEMBER STATES 
As stated in Article 3 of the Directive, the ultimate transposition date of the new 
remuneration rules was 1 November 2011. According to information contained in the Eur-
Lex system,15 all Member States have implemented their new legislation on compensation 
policies. This information is also confirmed by the EBA.16 
According to the Hausmann study,17 in most Member States the new remuneration rules 
are implemented in two different approaches: first, revision of corporate law, second, 
amendment of legislation on financial markets. While legal acts enforced by the supervisory 
bodies are binding, 'regulation of the financial markets sector is often effected by non-
statutory circulars of supervisory authorities following a ‘comply or explain’ approach'.18 As 
said by Y. Hausmann, 'the national initiatives which have so far been undertaken to 
implement the international reform [...] differ both as to the scope of application of the new 
or envisaged provisions as well in regard to the implementation of selected core principles 
in the area of governance of compensation, alignment of compensation with prudent risk-
taking and enhanced external disclosure of remuneration policies.'19 
 
Box 3: Experience of the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom 
In the UK, the Financial Service Authority (FSA) played the leading role in the adoption and 
implementation of the new remuneration rules. The Remuneration Code (published by the 
FSA on 12 August 2009) and the Walker Review on Corporate Governance in UK Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (issued by the UK Treasury Department on 26 November 2009) 
were the main regulatory initiatives, accompanied by various policies and guidelines of 
associations and private bodies.  
In order to finalise the incorporation of the CRD III provisions regarding executive 
remunerations into UK law, on 17 December 2010 the FSA Remuneration Code was 
revised. It came into force on 1 January 2011.20  
It is worth noting, that In the UK the regulation of the remuneration policy is one of the 
priorities of the current Prime Minster. According to the Prime Minister's announcement, the 
shareholders are to be empowered by having a straight vote on executive compensations. 
They would have to endorse salary packages and - more importantly - bonuses, instead of 
just having advisory votes as nowadays.21  
Source: Hausmann Y., Bechtold-Orth E., 2010. 
 
                                                 
15 National Execution Measures of Directive 2010/76/EU. 
16 Compliance table: Guidelines on Internal Governance (GL44), 9 January2012. 
17 Hausmann Y., Bechtold-Orth E., 2010. 
18 Hausmann Y., Bechtold-Orth E., 2010. 
19 Hausmann Y., Bechtold-Orth E., 2010. 
20 Financial Sector Remuneration in the UK and the EU, Morrison Foerster. 
21 David Cameron: my vision for a fair Britain, 7 January 201, Telegraph newspaper.  
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ANNEX: DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC, RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
IN REGARD TO REMUNERATION 
Article 22 
1. Home Member State competent authorities shall require that every credit institution have robust 
governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, 
transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor 
and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including 
sound administration and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices that are 
consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.  
[...] 
3. Home Member State competent authorities shall use the information collected in accordance with 
the criteria for disclosure established in point 15(f) of part 2 of Annex XII to benchmark remuneration 
trends and practices. The competent authorities shall provide the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors with that information.  
4. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors shall ensure the existence of guidelines on sound 
remuneration policies which comply with the principles set out in points 23 and 24 of Annex V. The 
guidelines shall take into account the principles on sound remuneration policies set out in the 
Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services 
sector.  
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors shall, inter alia, ensure the existence of guidelines 
to:  
(a) set specific criteria to determine the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable 
component of the total remuneration within the meaning of point 23(l) of Annex V;  
(b) specify instruments that can be eligible as instruments within the meaning of point 23(o)(ii) of 
Annex V that adequately reflect the credit quality of credit institutions within the meaning of point 
23(o) of that Annex.  
The Committee of European Securities Regulators shall cooperate closely with the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors in ensuring the existence of guidelines on remuneration policies for 
categories of staff involved in the provision of investment services and activities within the meaning 
of point 2 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC. 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors shall use the information received from the 
competent authorities in accordance with paragraph 3 to benchmark remuneration trends and 
practices at the Union level.  
5. Home Member State competent authorities shall collect information on the number of individuals 
per credit institution in pay brackets of at least EUR 1 million including the business area involved and 
the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution. That information shall 
be forwarded to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, which shall disclose it on an 
aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. The Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph and 
ensure the consistency of the information collected.  
Article 136  
1. Competent authorities shall require any credit institution that does not meet the requirements of 
this Directive to take the necessary actions or steps at an early stage to address the situation. For 
those purposes, the measures available to the competent authorities shall include the following:  
[...] 
(f) requiring credit institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of total net revenues 
when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base; 
[...]  
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Article 156 
By 1 April 2013 the Commission shall review and report on the provisions on remuneration, including 
those set out in Annexes V and XII, with particular regard to their efficiency, implementation and 
enforcement, taking into account international developments. That review shall identify any lacunae 
arising from the application of the principle of proportionality to those provisions. The Commission 
shall submit its report to the European Parliament and the Council together with any appropriate 
proposals. In order to ensure consistency and a level playing field, the Commission shall review the 
implementation of Article 54 with regard to the consistency of the penalties and other measures 
imposed and applied across the Union and, if appropriate, shall put forward proposals. The 
Commission’s periodic review of the application of this Directive shall ensure that the way it is applied 
does not result in manifest discrimination between credit institutions on the basis of their legal 
structure or ownership model. In order to ensure consistency in the prudential approach to capital, 
the Commission shall review the relevance of the reference to instruments within the meaning of 
Article 66(1a)(a) in point 23(o)(ii) of Annex V as soon as it takes an initiative to review the definition 
of capital instruments as provided for in Articles 56 to 67.  
Annex V 
11. REMUNERATION POLICIES 
[...] 
23. When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies, inclusive of salaries and 
discretionary pension benefits, for categories of staff including senior management, risk takers, staff 
engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the 
same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers, whose professional activities have 
a material impact on their risk profile, credit institutions shall comply with the following principles in a 
way and to the extent that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope 
and the complexity of their activities:  
(a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management 
and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the credit institution;  
(b) the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term 
interests of the credit institution, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest;  
(c) the management body, in its supervisory function, of the credit institution adopts and periodically 
reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for its implementation;  
(d) the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and 
independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by 
the management body in its supervisory function;  
(e) staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have 
appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives 
linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control;  
(f) the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is 
directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in point (24) or, if such a committee has 
not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function;  
(g) where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a 
combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit 
concerned and of the overall results of the credit institution and when assessing individual 
performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account;  
(h) the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the 
assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of 
performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the 
underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks;  
(i) the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the credit institution to strengthen its 
capital base;  
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(j) guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional and occurs only when hiring new staff and is 
limited to the first year of employment;  
(k) in the case of credit institutions that benefit from exceptional government intervention:  
(i) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenue where it is 
inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government 
support;  
(ii) the relevant competent authorities require credit institutions to restructure remuneration 
in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including, where 
appropriate, establishing limits to the remuneration of the persons who effectively direct the 
business of the credit institution within the meaning of Article 11(1);  
(iii) no variable remuneration is paid to the persons who effectively direct the business of the 
credit institution within the meaning of Article 11(1) unless justified;  
(l) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed 
component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation 
of a fully flexible policy, on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no 
variable remuneration component. Credit institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the 
fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration;  
(m) payments related to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time 
and are designed in a way that does not reward failure;  
(n) the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of 
variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks 
and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required. The allocation of the variable 
remuneration components within the credit institution shall also take into account all types of current 
and future risks;  
(o) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of 
an appropriate balance of:  
(i) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the credit 
institution concerned or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments, in case 
of a non-listed credit institution, and  
(ii) where appropriate, other instruments within the meaning of Article 66(1a)(a), that 
adequately reflect the credit quality of the credit institution as a going concern. The 
instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy 
designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the credit institution. Member 
States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those 
instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both 
the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (p) and 
the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred;  
(p) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is 
deferred over a period which is not less than three to 5 years and is correctly aligned with the nature 
of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. Remuneration payable 
under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable 
remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be 
deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, 
the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question;  
(q) the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable 
according to the financial situation of the credit institution as a whole, and justified according to the 
performance of the credit institution, the business unit and the individual concerned. Without 
prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration 
shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the 
credit institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of 
amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements;  
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(r) the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests 
of the credit institution. If the employee leaves the credit institution before retirement, discretionary 
pension benefits shall be held by the credit institution for a period of 5 years in the form of 
instruments referred to in point (o). In case of an employee reaching retirement, discretionary 
pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (o) 
subject to a five-year retention period;  
(s) staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- 
and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their 
remuneration arrangements;  
(t) variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the avoidance of the 
requirements of this Directive. The principles set out in this point shall be applied by credit 
institutions at group, parent company and subsidiary levels, including those established in offshore 
financial centres.  
24. Credit institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, 
the scope and the complexity of their activities shall establish a remuneration committee. The 
remuneration committee shall be constituted in such a way as to enable it to exercise competent and 
independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for 
managing risk, capital and liquidity. The remuneration committee shall be responsible for the 
preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which have implications for the risk 
and risk management of the credit institution concerned and which are to be taken by the 
management body in its supervisory function. The Chair and the members of the remuneration 
committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in 
the credit institution concerned. When preparing such decisions, the remuneration committee shall 
take into account the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the 
credit institution.  
Annex XII part 2: Information on remunerations to be provided 
15. The following information, including regular, at least annual, updates, shall be disclosed to the 
public regarding the remuneration policy and practices of the credit institution for those categories of 
staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile:  
(a) information concerning the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration 
policy, including if applicable, information about the composition and the mandate of a remuneration 
committee, the external consultant whose services have been used for the determination of the 
remuneration policy and the role of the relevant stakeholders;  
(b) information on link between pay and performance;  
(c) the most important design characteristics of the remuneration system, including information on 
the criteria used for performance measurement and risk adjustment, deferral policy and vesting 
criteria;  
(d) information on the performance criteria on which the entitlement to shares, options or variable 
components of remuneration is based;  
(e) the main parameters and rationale for any variable component scheme and any other non-cash 
benefits;  
(f) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by business area;  
(g) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by senior management and 
members of staff whose actions have a material impact on the risk profile of the credit institution, 
indicating the following:  
(i) the amounts of remuneration for the financial year, split into fixed and variable 
remuneration, and the number of beneficiaries;  
(ii) the amounts and forms of variable remuneration, split into cash, shares, share-linked 
instruments and other types;  
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(iii) the amounts of outstanding deferred remuneration, split into vested and unvested 
portions;  
(iv) the amounts of deferred remuneration awarded during the financial year, paid out and 
reduced through performance adjustments;  
(v) new sign-on and severance payments made during the financial year, and the number of 
beneficiaries of such payments; and  
(vi) the amounts of severance payments awarded during the financial year, number of 
beneficiaries and highest such award to a single person.  
For credit institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, 
scope and the complexity of their activities, the quantitative information referred to in this point shall 
also be made available to the public at the level of persons who effectively direct the business of the 
credit institution within the meaning of Article 11(1).  
Credit institutions shall comply with the requirements set out in this point in a manner that is 
appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities 
and without prejudice to Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
 
 

